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ABSTRACT 
 This research examines military doctrine and warfare maneuver strategy to 
determine its efficacy for improving law enforcement command and control efforts for 
mutual aid during paramilitary terrorist attacks. A qualitative analysis of case studies was 
conducted on terrorist attacks in Boston, Paris, and San Bernardino to uncover 
commonalities with the law enforcement response challenges. The identified law 
enforcement challenges were then compared with aspects of warfare maneuver strategy 
and military doctrine that were shown to demonstrate utility for improving law 
enforcement response efforts. The results indicate that warfare maneuver strategy and 
military doctrine can be used to improve law enforcement command and control efforts 
for mutual aid during paramilitary terrorist attacks. Recommendations include 
implementing a reciprocal model of command and control, establishing a strategy for 
providing mutual aid resources during paramilitary terrorist attacks, and providing 
training that reinforces key principles of military doctrine without creating a police force 
that mirrors the military. To summarize, this is a SMART approach, a Strategic Mutual 
Aid Response to Terrorism. 
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Contemporary strategies for managing law enforcement resources during terrorist 
attacks rely on mutual aid and rapid deployment. While these two combined strategies are 
useful when responding to lone, active-shooter attacks, they have not been effective 
strategies for stopping paramilitary terrorist attacks (PTA). PTAs are by multiple terrorists 
who are trained and well-armed, and who use military tactics in urban terrain to nullify law 
enforcement response efforts. Fortunately, the law enforcement profession does not need 
to develop its own conceptual framework for addressing these challenges. For decades, 
U.S. military war colleges have combined scholarly and applied research to create doctrine 
and warfare maneuver strategies to deal with human conflict. 0F1 And while the mission of 
the military is distinctly different from law enforcement, the challenges associated with 
human conflict are the same. This thesis asks the following question: How can military 
doctrine and maneuver warfare strategy be used to improve law enforcement command and 
control efforts for mutual aid during active PTAs?  
The following research examines PTAs that occurred in Boston, Paris, and San 
Bernardino. These case studies were chosen because, in each attack, terrorists used 
militarized infantry tactics in urban terrain to neutralize law enforcement response. The 
comparative analysis of all three case studies identified common law enforcement response 
challenges. Specifically, law enforcement suffered from an uncoordinated police response, 
police self-deployment, and police vehicles blocking ingress and egress to the location of 
attacks. Next, the research focuses on Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine and maneuver 
strategy publications to study the nature of human conflict and related theories.  
The Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare explains how the combination 
of decision-making, mission tactics, and commander’s intent are used to fight smartly. An 
examination of the nature and theory of command and control shows how the command 
and control structure can be used to create swift and harmonious efforts to defeat an 
                                                 
1 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “war college,” accessed June 12, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-college. 
xvi 
opponent. Furthermore, the relationship between strategy and tactics uncovered how 
strategy is a problem-solving process, which commanders can use to gain an advantage 
and defeat an opposing force. While strategy focuses on the goals to be achieved, tactics 
refer to the concepts and methods used to achieve those objectives. 1F2 
A comparison of the Marine Corps strategic concepts with the law enforcement 
challenges identified in the case studies revealed solutions for improving law enforcement 
command and control efforts for mutual aid during active PTAs. The following 
recommendations focus on further actions to be carried out by police executives/
commanders at municipal, county, and state law enforcement organizations. 
(1) Police executives should implement a reciprocal model of command and 
control to improve mutual aid efforts during PTAs.  
All three case studies examined in this thesis demonstrate that police response to 
active PTAs gravitate toward disorder. A reciprocal model of command and control can 
assist law enforcement commanders and subordinates with capitalizing on rapidly 
emerging opportunities to exploit terrorist vulnerabilities when responding to PTAs.  
(2) Police leadership should establish a strategy for providing mutual aid 
resources during PTAs while maintaining response capabilities within their 
own jurisdictions. 
A continual challenge in all three case studies was the self-deployment of officers. 
Law enforcement executives should create a process for identifying and dispatching their 
police officers to neighboring jurisdictions that are confronted with a PTA. At the same 
time, the law enforcement organization providing mutual aid should retain adequate 
resources within its own jurisdiction so it has the appropriate resources to respond to a 
secondary PTA in the organization’s area of responsibility.  
                                                 
2 U.S. Marine Corps, Tactics, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Navy, 1997), 3, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201-3%20Tactics.pdf. 
xvii 
(3) Police executives should implement training that reinforces the importance 
of mission tactics, low-level initiative, and shaping the environment to 
improve law enforcement response to PTAs. 
Law enforcement executives should ensure subordinates receive training that 
emphasizes low-level initiative while reinforcing the importance of restrictive control 
measures. Commanders should also be provided with training that exposes them to the 
common challenges associated with the positions they hold in the command and control 
structure.  
(4) Create, develop, and deliver a formalized training program to improve law 
enforcement command and control efforts during PTAs and other acts of 
terrorism.  
Unlike the military, the law enforcement profession does not have a formalized 
education institution to instruct law enforcement commanders in the theoretical framework 
of maneuver, strategy, and command and control efforts to effectively mitigate the 
challenges associated with PTAs. The Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the 
Naval Postgraduate School is in the ideal position to bring together experts, develop such 
a course, and lead a new intellectual renaissance for how the law enforcement profession 
thinks about, prepares for and responds to PTAs. 
xviii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The law enforcement profession in the United States has traditionally struggled to 
prepare for the next attack or other threat to public safety. For example, in 1965 during the 
Watts Riots in Los Angeles, California, heavily armed snipers systematically targeted law 
enforcement officers who did not have the strategy, tactics, training, or equipment to 
adequately stop the threat. 2F1 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were 
subsequently developed to counter these threats to society. In 1997, two bank robbers 
armed with automatic weapons and body armor shot at responding officers who were only 
armed with handguns and shotguns. 3F2 The suspects held the officers at bay while the entire 
nation watched on live TV.4F3 After this incident, law enforcement organizations in the 
United States began to issue rifles to patrol officers. In 1999, in Columbine, Colorado, two 
teenage suspects killed 13 people and committed suicide before law enforcement officers 
were in a position to intervene. 5F4 The concept of rapid deployment, a strategy used to stop 
active shooters, was subsequently developed and implemented by law enforcement 
agencies across the United States.  
Law enforcement has been similarly ill-prepared for terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. 
Over the last decade, from Paris to Boston and San Bernardino, terrorists have used 
                                                 
1 “S.W.A.T. Special Weapons and Tactics,” Los Angeles Police Department, accessed June 12, 2019, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_the_lapd/content_basic_view/848. 
2 Ryan Fonseca, “Timeline of Terror: How the Infamous North Hollywood Shootout Unfolded 20 
Years Ago,” Daily News Projects, February 2017, http://projects.dailynews.com/north-hollywood-
shootout/. 
3 Fonseca. 
4 Illinois State Police Academy, Rapid Deployment as a Response to an Active Shooter Incident 
(Springfield: Illinois State Police Academy, 2003), https://www.scribd.com/doc/16693309/Rapid-
Deployment-as-a-Response-to-an-Active-Shooter-Incident. 
2 
paramilitary tactics to attack urban centers and inflict mass casualties.6F5 Although these 
paramilitary terrorist attacks (PTA) have been years and miles apart, the persistent pattern 
identified in each attack was the ease in which terrorists inflicted harm and avoided capture. 
PTAs are carried out by multiple individuals who are trained and well-armed and who use 
military tactics in urban terrain to nullify traditional law enforcement response.  
Contemporary strategies for managing law enforcement resources during terrorist 
attacks rely on mutual aid and rapid deployment. P PMutual aid is a framework for sharing 
resources when responding to natural disasters, and while it excels as a means to plan and 
prepare for critical incidents, it does not guide deployment strategies, tactics, or the means 
to condense competing efforts into a unified force to combat PTAs. Additionally, rapid 
deployment is a tactic that was designed to stop lone school shooters and not PTAs. 7F6 While 
these two combined strategies are useful when responding to lone active-shooter attacks, 
they have not been effective strategies for stopping PTAs. Most importantly, law 
enforcement lacks a coherent strategy for thinking about how to best plan, prepare, and 
deploy resources during PTAs. Fortunately, the law enforcement profession does not need 
to develop its own conceptual framework for addressing these challenges. For decades, 
U.S. military war colleges have combined scholarly and applied research to create doctrine 
and warfare maneuver strategies to deal with human conflict. 8F7 And while the mission of 
the military is distinctly different than law enforcement, the challenges associated with 
human conflict are the same.  
                                                 
5 John P Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “Preventing Another Mumbai: Building a Police Operational Art,” 
CTC Sentinel 2, no. 6 (2009); Rick Braziel et al., Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Critical Incident Review of 
the San Bernardino Public Safety Response to the December 2, 2015, Terrorist Shooting Incident at the 
Inland Regional Center (Washington DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016); Massachusetts Emergency 
Management Agency et al., After-Action Report for the Response to the  2013 Boston Marathon Bombings 
(Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2014), https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/after-action-report-for-the-response-to-the-2013-boston-marathon-
bombings_0.pdf. 
6 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional 
Threats, NCJ 210679 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2005), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456684; and Illinois State Police Academy, Rapid Deployment as a 
Response to an Active Shooter Incident. 
7 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “war college,” accessed June 12, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/war-college. 
3 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
Paramilitary terrorist attacks on U.S. soil continue to harm the public and frustrate 
law enforcement efforts to efficiently respond to and stop the threat. 9F8 Identifying new 
response strategies has the potential to improve homeland security and save lives. This 
literature review has been divided into three sections. The first section reviews key 
components of military doctrine that include warfighting theory, command and control,   
and strategy and tactics. The second section analyzes paramilitary terrorism and how it 
differs from conventional types of attacks. The last section describes law enforcement 
mutual-aid strategies. It explores the national response framework and the difference 
between mutual and automatic aid response efforts.  
2. Military Doctrine 
Several Marine Corps publications make up the framework for understanding the 
complexities of combat and provide unifying strategies to fight and win wars. These 
publications are the driving philosophies of the Marine Corps and have significantly 
affected theories and concepts about war throughout the world. 10F9  
a. Warfighting 
The U.S. Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication is the foundational document 
upon which all Marine Corps doctrine, strategy, and philosophy are built. 11F10 Warfighting 
takes a broad perspective on the nature of war, including its “moral, mental, and physical 
characteristics and demands.”12F11 The underlying concept is that to wage and win wars 
successfully, one must understand the nature of war in all its complexities. The 
complexities of war include challenges such as friction, uncertainty, fluidity, disorder, 
                                                 
8 Bill Tallen, “Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, no. 2 (June 
2018), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/123. 
9 U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 1997), 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf. 
10 U.S. Marine Corps. 
11 U.S. Marine Corps. 
4 
violence, danger, and the role that humans play in navigating these dangerous encounters. 
Warfighting brings clarity to the chaos of human conflict while continually reminding the 
reader that “everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”13F12 
b. Command and Control 
Command and control is the most critical concept of the Marine Corps warfighting 
theory. 14 F13 Without command and control, military operations lose form and function and 
degenerate into chaos. In contrast, effective command and control cuts through the “fog of 
war” and provides sharp lines for action and unity of efforts in support of common goals. 
The application of command and control is known as “mission command and control,” 
which is best described as a leadership philosophy that encourages action and “embraces 
calculated risk to generate opportunity.”15F14 Mission command and control is unique in that 
it is best suited for dealing with uncertainty and time, both of which are ever-present 
challenges in combat. 
c. Strategy and Tactics 
Marine Corps strategy and tactics build on command and control by providing a 
framework for understanding the dynamic relationship between policies and the “violent 
expression of politics,” also known as war.16F15 The constant struggle among policy, politics, 
and conflict is described as a complex adaptive system, which is inherently 
unpredictable.17F16 The challenge for the strategic decision-maker is to develop a resilient 
strategy while balancing opportunity and risk in the face of uncertainty. Whereas strategy 
                                                 
12 U.S. Marine Corps. 
13 U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Navy, 1996), 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%206%20Command%20and%20Control.pdf. 




15 U.S. Marine Corps, Strategy, Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1-1 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Navy, 1997), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201-1%20Strategy.pdf. 
16 U.S. Marine Corps. 
5 
focuses on when, where, why, and how to bring opposing forces together, tactics focus on 
the methods needed to win the conflict. Concepts such as exploiting terrain, being faster 
than the enemy, creating flexible plans, and building an advantage are all examples of 
tactics used to support the overall strategy. 18F17 
3. Paramilitary Terrorism 
a. Defining Terrorism 
The first challenge in understanding terrorism is choosing among the more than 250 
definitions that exist.19F18 This variation most likely stems from terrorism being a concept 
that can take many different forms and be used in new and creative ways. For this research, 
the framework for understanding terrorism comprises the definitions used by the 
Department of Defense and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Department of 
Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in 
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”20 F19 Similarly, the 
FBI defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property 
to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.”21F20 Reviewing the numerous definitions of 
terrorism reveals the pattern of terrorist attacks as political, psychological, violent, 
dynamic, and deliberate. 22F21 
In a working paper titled “Evolving Terrorist Threat,” the Strategic Foresight 
Initiative, which is funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, examines key 
                                                 
17 U.S. Marine Corps, Tactics, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-3 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Navy, 1997), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201-3%20Tactics.pdf. 
18 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3rd ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 35. 
19 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019), 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 
20 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002-2005 (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 
2005), https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005. 
21 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First 
Century (Ft. Leavenworth: Department of the Army, 2005). 
6 
trends and drivers of terrorist tactics and how they may shift to exploit vulnerabilities in 
the United States. 23F22 The initiative’s research shows that terrorists tend to gravitate toward 
methods of attack that “avoid effective countermeasures and exploit vulnerabilities.”24F23 An 
example of such a method is an active-shooter incident. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or 
attempting to kill people in confined and populated area.”25F24 It is important to note the 
DHS’s definition of an active-shooter attack does not account for teams of terrorists who 
use firearms to kill people. Moreover, while conventional terrorist attacks, such as 
chemical, biological, or improvised explosive devices, will likely result in more casualties, 
terrorist active-shooter attacks have a higher chance of success. 26F25  
b. Paramilitary Terrorist Attacks 
The best way to understand the dynamics of terrorists who use active-shooter tactics 
to inflict harm is through the lens of paramilitary terrorist attacks. PTAs have been 
described as “terrorists operating in platoon or squad sized elements using military small 
arms, improvised explosive devices, and heavy weapons. They use snipers to target first 
responders and use defensive positions meant to repel assaulting law enforcement 
officers.”27F26 These types of PTAs require a significant amount of training, equipment, 
coordination, and resolve to hold and maintain positions of advantage against responding 
law enforcement resources.  
c. Militarized Maneuver Terrorism 
A more common form of PTA is militarized maneuver terrorism (MMT), which 
involves “multiple (more than two) highly trained individuals, well-armed and capable of 
                                                 
22 Strategic Foresight Initiative, “Evolving Terrorist Threat” (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, September 2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=692881. 
23 Strategic Foresight Initiative, 2. 
24 Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond (Washington, DC: Department 
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executing planned and coordinated attacks.”28F27 MMT avoids direct conflict with law 
enforcement by using hit-and-run attacks to carry out acts of violence. Hit-and-run attacks, 
also referred to as swarming attacks, are “quick, coordinated strikes from small units.”29F28 
The primary objective of these tactics is to attack a specific target and then flee before 
responding forces can arrive to stop the attack or capture the assailants.  
While MMT involves more than two attackers committing acts of violence, PTAs 
can also be carried out by smaller teams of only two terrorists who use firearms and/or 
explosives to carry out hit-and-run tactics. In its simplest form, and for this research, PTAs 
are best defined as a team of at least two people who use military tactics, strategies, and 
equipment to carry out acts of violence.  
4. Mutual Aid 
a. National Incident Management Systems 
The National Response Framework guides the nation’s response to disasters and 
emergencies and is built on the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 30F29 NIMS 
is a scalable, flexible, and adaptable concept that assists law enforcement with managing 
everything from local incidents to natural disasters and even large-scale terrorist attacks. 31F30 
The National Incident Management System manual produced by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency goes into great detail explaining how to establish and maintain 
command and control during emergencies with the use of the Incident Command System 
(ICS). ICS establishes procedures for the incident commander to follow, and if the demands 
of the emergency outweigh the agency’s response capabilities, the incident commander can 
initiate a request for mutual aid and transition to a unified command. 32F31  
                                                 
27 Broyles, 4. 
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Department of Homeland Security, 2016). 
30 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 7. 
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(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2017). 
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b. Mutual Aid Structure  
Mutual aid is built on the idea of “neighbor helping neighbor” and can be traced to 
the early 19th century during the Westward Expansion, when U.S. Army troops helped 
local county sheriffs.33F32 One of the earliest challenges with mutual-aid response in 
California was the lack of statutory authority to create written agreements for sharing 
resources. The California Emergency Services Act of 1970 established the legal structure 
for agencies to share resources, and since that time, the use of mutual aid has rapidly 
expanded. 34F33 The significant increase of mutual-aid requests was identified during a 
National Sheriff’s Association Conference in 2005, which led to the U.S. Department of 
Justice creating the publication Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting 
Regional Threats.35F34 This document reviews the structure of mutual-aid agreements and 
expands on its utility when used as a part of the ICS structure and NIMS. Moreover, it 
provides guidance on establishing terms and conditions for mutual-aid agreements and 
identifies pre-deployment considerations and best practices for activating a mutual-aid 
plan. 
c. Automatic Aid 
One of the challenges described in the literature about the mutual-aid process is that 
it takes time. The incident commander must first realize the demands of an emergency has 
exceeded current response capabilities and then request mutual aid from a neighboring 
agency, which must respond to provide assistance. 36F35 A concept to overcome the time delay 
with responding resources is known as automatic aid, whereby neighboring jurisdictions 
automatically dispatch resources to the scene of an emergency. Therefore, while the type 
of assistance offered in automatic aid depends on the emergency, mutual-aid agreements 
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recognize those responding agencies may need to withdraw resources to address 
emergencies in their jurisdictions. 37F36  
5. Summary 
This literature review examines the challenges associated with PTAs. Military 
doctrine and warfare maneuver strategy identify the framework for effectively addressing 
the uncertainty and complexity intrinsic to human conflict. It suggests that well-established 
command-and-control structures, coupled with supporting strategies and tactics, can be 
used to exploit opposing forces while creating opportunities for success and minimizing 
risks. These same concepts and strategies have also been adopted by terrorists to defeat 
conventional law enforcement response strategies. The National Response Framework of 
NIMS and ICS guides mutual-aid strategies but does not adequately address the 
complexities and challenges associated with PTAs. This literature review emphasizes the 
need to update current law enforcement response to PTAs. It is expected that a comparative 
analysis among PTAs, military doctrine, and warfare maneuver strategy will identify new 
law enforcement response strategies that can be integrated into existing mutual aid 
response frameworks.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis asks the following question: How can military doctrine and maneuver 
warfare strategy be used to improve law enforcement command and control efforts for 
mutual aid during active PTAs?  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design involves a qualitative analysis of case studies, military 
doctrine, and warfare maneuver strategies. Qualitative analysis of case studies is best used 
to “learn more about an unknown or poorly understood situation.”38F37 Furthermore, 
according to Robert Yin, case studies are the “preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
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questions are being posed” and are useful when attempting to “understand complex social 
phenomena.”39 F38 The analytical framework focuses on law enforcement response to 
paramilitary terrorist attacks coupled with military doctrine and maneuver warfare 
strategies to improve law enforcement command-and-control efforts. 
First, I describe each paramilitary terrorist attack on urban centers in chronological 
order. The Boston Marathon bombing is first, followed by the Paris terrorist attack, and 
then the San Bernardino terrorist attack. These case studies were selected because, in each 
attack, terrorists used militarized infantry tactics in urban terrain to nullify law enforcement 
response. With each case study, I describe the strategies and methods used by the terrorists 
to carry out their attacks and the law enforcement response to each incident. Then, using 
the lessons learned as identified in the case studies, I compare the terrorists’ methods and 
duration of attack, the number of people injured or killed, and the challenges confronting 
law enforcement response.  
Next, I review the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine and maneuver strategy 
publications to examine the nature of human conflict and related theories of war. This 
includes describing the correlations between command and control, strategies of 
incapacitation versus erosion, tactics, and the human dimensions in conflict including 
friction, uncertainty, surprise, and centers of gravity. 40F39 Last, I compare the Marine Corps 
strategic concepts with the law enforcement challenges identified in the case studies to 
illuminate new ways of thinking about solutions for law enforcement preparation and 
response to PTAs.  
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II. CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with a review of the 2013 terrorist attack at the Boston 
Marathon in Massachusetts. The strategies and methods used by the terrorists to carry out 
their attacks are described as well as with the law enforcement response. I follow the same 
process for the Paris and San Bernardino case studies. Next, using the information from 
the official after-action reports from each of these attacks, I list the terrorists’ methods and 
duration of attack, the number of people injured or killed, and the challenges confronting 
law enforcement response. Charting is used to identify commonalities in all three attacks. 
B. BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
Marathon races are known for testing the limits of human endurance, and the 
terrorist attacks at the Boston Marathon would test the endurance of an entire city and 
nation. After the bombs exploded near the finish line, 118 people were transported by 
ambulance to local hospitals and more than 260 people sought medical attention for injuries 
received. 41F40 It would take first responders three days to locate the suspects, and upon first 
contact, police were met with explosives and rapid gunfire. The terrorists were able to 
exploit conventional law enforcement deployment strategies with hit-and-run tactics for at 
least nine hours before finally taken into custody. 42F41  
1. Terrorist Attack 
In 2011, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) contacted the FBI and the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with information about two brothers, Tamerlan and 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who were possible Islamic extremists and living in the United 
States. 43F42 The Tsarnaevs immigrated to the United States from Kyrgyzstan in 2003 and the 
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FSB had information that the brothers were attempting to meet with extremist terrorists 
groups in Russia. 44F43 The CIA shared the information with the National Counterterrorism 
Center, which added the brothers to the terrorist watchlist, but this did not prevent 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev from traveling to Russia. 45F44 It is unclear if Tamerlan met with Islamic 
extremists while in Russia, but he did begin sharing Islamic extremist propaganda while 
there.46F45  
In 2012, one year after Tamerlan’s trip to Russia, the Tsarnaev brothers had fully 
functional improvised explosive devices and were ready to carry out an attack. During their 
search for a target, they discovered the Boston Marathon was only a few days away and 
would be an ideal event to carry out their attack. 47F46 On April 15, 2013, the Tsarnaev 
brothers, each carrying a backpack with an explosive device, placed their backpacks on the 
ground by the finish line of the marathon and walked away. 48F47 At the same time, marathon 
participants were running across the finish line with arms raised in victory. At 2:49 p.m., 
runners and spectators suddenly found themselves on the ground with injuries from two 
deadly explosions.49F48 The police response to the area of the explosion was immediate but 
the attackers were already gone. The Tsarnaev brothers would avoid contact with law 
enforcement for the next two days. 
On April 18, the FBI held a press conference and while they did not know the names 
of the attackers, they did release photos of the Tsarnaev brothers that were captured from 
surveillance cameras during the attack. 50F49 A few hours later, the Tsarnaev brothers killed a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology police officer because they wanted to steal his gun, 
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but they were unable to remove it from the safety holster.51F50 At 11:20 p.m., the Tsarnaev 
brothers carjacked a Mercedes sports utility vehicle (SUV) and drove around with the 
victim still inside.52F51 The victim was eventually able to escape and reported the crime to 
police as well as the fact that the two suspects identified themselves as the Boston Marathon 
Bombing suspects and were planning to carry out more attacks. 53F52 
On April 15, at 12:19 a.m., dispatchers at the Watertown Police Department told 
officers about the stolen SUV and that it was being tracked in the area of 81 Dexter 
Avenue.54F53 However, the dispatchers did not know that the occupants of the SUV were the 
suspects from the Boston Marathon Bombing. 55 F54 A police officer responded to the area and 
saw the SUV but decided to keep his distance and not act until another officer arrived to 
help. 56F55 The officer advised dispatch that a Honda sedan was following the SUV and both 
cars made a left turn onto Laurel Street. 57F56 As the officer turned onto Laurel Street, 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev quickly exited the SUV and started walking toward the officer while 
firing a gun.58F57 At the same time, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev exited the Honda sedan and began 
throwing improvised explosive devices at the responding officers.59F58 During the ensuing 
gunfight, Tamerlan was shot by police and as Dzhokhar fled the location in the stolen SUV, 
he ran over his brother who was lying in the street. 60F59 Tamerlan was subsequently taken 
into custody and later died in a hospital from his wounds but Dzhokhar was still on the 
run.61F60 
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At 1:57 a.m., law enforcement established a 20-block perimeter to search for 
Dzhokhar and advised all residents to shelter in place. 62F61 After 16 hours of a detailed search 
and no sign of Dzhokhar, law enforcement concluded their efforts and lifted the order to 
shelter in place.63F62 Less than an hour later, a citizen was investigating a loose strap on his 
boat and saw a bloody person hiding inside. The citizen called 911 and within minutes, 
over 100 police officers were at the location. 64F63 At 8:41 p.m., after a tense standoff, the FBI 
Hostage Response team persuaded Dzhokhar to surrender, and he was subsequently taken 
into custody. Table 1 shows the method of attack used by the Boston Marathon Bombing 
terrorists, as explained in the case study. I use the data from this table to identify the 
commonalities between methods of attack in the Paris and San Bernardino terrorist attacks. 
Table 1. Method of Attack, Boston  Terrorists 
Method of Attack Boston 
Organization  Two-person team 
Training  Internet research on how to make 
improvised explosive devices  
Equipment  Backpacks with explosives 
 Improvised explosive hand grenades 
 Handguns  
Strategy  Selected large-scale public event to attack 
Tactics  Hit-and-run  
 Ambushed police officers 
 
2. Law Enforcement Response 
The Boston Marathon is a unique race in that the route of the course is not circular 
but in a straight line through eight different cities and towns. 65F64 The design of the Boston 
Marathon route requires multi-jurisdiction coordination and extensive pre-planning efforts, 
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which includes a robust public safety committee. Each year, the public safety committee 
meets in January to review and update their operational plans based on lessons learned 
from prior events. 66F65 The public safety committee also conducts tabletop exercises for many 
different scenarios such as responding to medical emergencies and even terrorist attacks. 67F66 
As a result of experience and scenario training, the public safety committee assigns a large 
contingent of medical personnel and police officers to the finish line.68F67 As a result, when 
the terrorist bombs exploded at the end of the course, the first responders were already first 
on scene.  
The police officers, medical personnel, volunteers, and even spectators 
immediately reacted to the bombing attacks by providing medical attention to those who 
were wounded. 69F68 Some police officers began coordinating the response for additional 
resources and explicitly told responding personnel to avoid blocking the roadway with their 
vehicles. This coordination allowed ambulances to quickly access the area to gather and 
evacuate those who needed immediate medical attention within 22 minutes of the 
bombings. 70F69 Police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams who were already staged at 
the end of the course began to sweep the area for additional bombs while also evacuating 
people from the area to increase safety and preserve evidence. 71F70 At the same time, police 
officers a mile up from the end of the race blocked the course so that runners were 
prevented from continuing into harm’s way. 72F71 
As police and medical personnel responded to the bombings, senior commanders 
who were already on scene before the first blast began to form a joint command post, but 
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had to move several times due to possible nearby secondary explosive devices.73F72 While 
the senior commanders searched for an optimal location to establish an on-scene command 
post, police and fire executives decided to meet at the Westin Copley Place Hotel to 
establish a Unified Command. 74F73 Senior commanders eventually arrived at the Unified 
Command post at which time coordination efforts began to take shape. For example, the 
Unified Command directed SWAT teams to deploy at hospitals and other critical areas in 
case there were secondary attacks. 75F74 With no other explosions or known suspects to pursue, 
the Unified Command transitioned from a response mode to investigative operations. In a 
few days’ time, the terrorists would resurface and their use of hit-and-run tactics would test 
the resolve of responding police. 
During the early morning hours of Friday, April 19, the Watertown police officer 
driving behind a stolen SUV and a suspicious Honda sedan had no idea he was following 
the terrorists from the Boston bombing. As the officer followed the vehicles onto a side 
street, he was immediately met with gunfire from the terrorists. 76F75 A police sergeant arrived 
on-scene within seconds of the first gunshots and both officers returned fire while also 
radioing for help from surrounding police agencies. 77F76 By all accounts, the ensuing gun 
battle was chaotic as the terrorists continued to shoot at responding officers while also 
throwing improvised explosive devices.78F77 The response of additional police was 
overwhelming and consisted of officers from Watertown PD, Boston PD, Cambridge PD, 
the Transit Police, and the Massachusetts State Police (MSP), which resulted in over 200 
bullets fired by law enforcement officers.79 F78 When officers finally shot and tackled 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the second terrorist, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, got into the stolen SUV and 
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attempted to drive away. Because so many of the responding officers parked in a manner 
that blocked other police cars from moving, no officers were able to give immediate 
pursuit. 80F79 Dzhokhar abandoned the SUV a half-mile away and escaped capture at that 
time.81F80 
The resulting 18-hour search by law enforcement officers trying to capture 
Dzhokhar would be filled with confusion and conflict. Police cordoned off an area 20 
blocks wide to search for the terrorist and a shelter in place order was put in place to keep 
the public out of harm’s way. 82F81 The initial searches for Dzhokhar were uncoordinated and 
driven by independent actions taken by officers on the ground. A contributing factor to the 
confusion was that over 2,500 officers from 166 different federal, state, and police agencies 
arrived at the operations staging area, many of who self-deployed without requested by 
higher command. 83 F82 Moreover, the Unified Command did not create a system to track or 
manage these additional officers so over time the officers would respond to areas on their 
own accord based on radio traffic.84F83 A unified command was eventually obtained and the 
decision was made to divide the search area into grids with teams of officers assigned to 
search specific grids.85F84 The process for a systematic search quickly unraveled. First, search 
teams were unable to secure the areas they had already cleared, which meant that Dzhokhar 
could have easily doubled back and hid in a location that was already checked. 86F85 Second, 
as teams were searching their assigned grids, the Command Post would reassign them to 
other areas based on 911 calls from residents who saw or heard something suspicious. 87F86 
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After 16 hours, law enforcement abandoned their search and removed the order to shelter 
in place.88F87 
When a citizen in Watertown discovered a person hiding inside his boat, he 
immediately called 911 and within minutes, three officers from Watertown PD and three 
from the Boston PD were at the location. 89F88 The senior officer on-scene, believing the 
person hiding in the boat could be the outstanding terrorist, radioed for help from a tactical 
team. 90F89 The second the transmission went out, a multitude of police officers from different 
agencies heard the request and decided to self-deploy to the area. Within minutes over 100 
police officers surrounded the residence with the boat. 91F90 The area surrounding the target 
location was chaotic. Officers were fighting over who was in charge and seconds later a 
tactical officer, positioned on a nearby roof, saw movement in the boat and decided to shoot 
his rifle.92F91 The area erupted in police gunfire. A commander who was on-scene can be 
heard on audio tapes shouting for officers to “cease fire” but bullets continued flying for at 
least 10 seconds with hundreds of rounds being fired. 93F92 As the gun smoke cleared, an 
incident commander finally emerged and was able to gain control of the scene. The FBI’s 
Hostage Rescue Team, which includes crisis negotiators, started negotiating with 
Dzhokhar and after almost two hours, he was finally taken into custody. 94 F93 Table 2 shows 
the law enforcement response challenges as explained in the case study. The data from this 
table is used to identify the commonalities between the law enforcement response 
challenges in the Paris and San Bernardino terrorist attacks. 
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Table 2. Law Enforcement Response Challenges, Boston Marathon 
Bombing 
Law Enforcement Response Boston 
Challenges  Uncoordinated police response 
 Police officers self-deployed 
 Police vehicles blocked ingress 
and egress routes 
 Police unable to pursue fleeing 
terrorist 
 Lack of weapons discipline 
 
3. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon Bombing, the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security (the Committee) investigated the 
circumstances regarding the terrorist attack and released their findings in March 2104.95F94 
Members of the Committee traveled to Russia to learn more about Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s 
activities there but the information they gathered was conflicting. The Committee did not 
find any evidence that Tamerlan had connections to an external terror network but they did 
state it was possible Tamerlan’s trip to Russia afforded him the opportunity to meet with 
Islamist extremists. 96F95 In 2014, attorneys who were preparing to prosecute Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev filed a pre-trial motion that stated it “would have been difficult for the Tsarnaevs 
to fabricate successfully without training or assistance from others ... strongly suggesting 
that others had built, or at least helped the Tsarnaevs build, the bombs, and thus might have 
built more.”97F96 It is still unclear if the Tsarnaevs had help in planning their attack or how 
they learned to use the explosives they detonated. What is clear is that with the use of 
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explosives, firearms, and hit-and-run tactics, the Tsarnaev brothers successfully killed 5 
people, injured over 260, and avoided capture for five days. 98F97  
C. PARIS TERRORIST ATTACKS 
Paris is the capital city of France and is located in the northern part of the country. 
The city is divided into 20 districts and contains 717 “sensitive urban zones,” the majority 
of which are populated by Muslims who experience the highest rate of poverty and 
unemployment. 99F98 The large population of young, disenfranchised Muslim men has led to 
an increase in radicalization and terrorist attacks in Paris. For example, on January 7, 2015, 
two terrorists armed with rifles shot and killed 11 people at the Charlie Hebdo magazine 
offices. 100F99 Then, on August 25, 2015, a terrorist on a high-speed train traveling from 
Brussels to Paris started shooting. 101F100 Fortunately for the passengers on the train, the 
terrorist was quickly subdued by three Americans, which significantly limited the number 
of people injured. 102F101 A few months later, Paris would find itself at the center of another 
terrorist attack, but this time 130 people would be dead with hundreds more injured. 
1. Terrorist Attacks 
Three days before the terrorist attacks took place in Paris, two brothers, Salah and 
Brahim Abdeslam arrived in the city and finalized the planning and logistics to carry out 
coordinated, paramilitary terrorist attacks. 103F102 On November 13, 2015, a total of nine 
terrorists split into three groups and deployed to their target locations dispersed throughout 
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the city. 104F103 The targets selected to attack were the historic stadium, the Stade de France, 
the 10th and 11th arrondissement Parisian café and bars district, and last, the Bataclan 
concert hall.  
At 9:20 p.m., a terrorist wearing explosives was stopped by security as he attempted 
to enter the Stade de France. The terrorist detonated the explosives, killing himself and a 
bystander. Five minutes later, in the 10th arrondissement, the second group of terrorists 
began shooting at groups of customers at the restaurants and bars, killing 15 people. The 
terrorists used hit-and-run tactics where they would shoot at patrons and then flee in a 
vehicle to attack another location. At 9:30 p.m., back at the Stade de France, a second 
terrorist detonated his suicide vest, killing only himself. 105F104 Meanwhile, the terrorists in the 
10th arrondissement moved to the 11th district and continued shooting patrons of the 
restaurants and bars, killing 19 people.  
At 9:40 p.m., while people were still bleeding in the streets in front of Paris 
restaurants and bars, a lone terrorist wearing explosives entered a restaurant and detonated 
his device, injuring 15 people. 106F105 At the same exact time, three terrorists exited a vehicle 
in front of the Bataclan concert hall and immediately killed the security guard. The 
terrorists then entered the location and began shooting into the crowd, killing a total of 90 
people and taking the rest hostage. 107F106 At 9:53 p.m., back at the Stade de France, a third 
terrorist detonated his suicide vest, killing only himself. 108F107 At 12:20 a.m., French police 
finally stormed the Bataclan concert hall, at which time the two terrorists inside detonated 
their vests, again killing only themselves. All the hostages were freed. 109F108 In all, the nine 
terrorists killed 130 people and injured almost 500, making their assault the deadliest attack 
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on French soil since World War II.110F109 Table 3 shows the method of attack used by the 
Paris terrorists as explained in the case study. The data from this table is used to identify 
the commonalities between the methods of attack in the Boston and San Bernardino 
terrorist attacks. 
Table 3. Method of Attack, Paris Terrorists 
Method of Attack Paris 
Organization  Nine attackers divided into three teams 
Training  Firearms, explosives, and tactical 
training in Syria 
Equipment  Explosive/suicide vests 
 Rifles 
 Handguns 
Strategy  Selected locations with large gatherings 
of people 
 Scouted locations days prior to attacking 
 Simultaneous attacks 
Tactics  Simultaneous dispersed attacks 
 Hit-and-run  
 Used encrypted smartphone applications 
to communicate between attack teams 
 
2. Law Enforcement Response 
France has two national police forces. The Police Nationale is the civil law 
enforcement organization in France and is responsible for public safety in large cities and 
towns. 111F110 The other police entity is the military Gendarmerie, which focuses on small 
towns, rural areas, and border protection. 112F111 Both police forces were present in Paris during 
the terrorist attacks but the responsibility for response fell on the civil police forces. 
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Specifically, both the Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) and the Recherche, 
Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion (RAID) units are required to deploy under a unified 
command structure known as Force d’intervention de la Police Nationale (FIPN). 113 F112 
When the first terrorist detonated his suicide vest outside the Stade de France, 
police forces inside the stadium rushed French president Hollande—who was at the 
stadium watching the soccer game—to safety. 114F113 Police suspected the explosion was 
designed to force a mass evacuation so the decision was made to place the stadium on 
lockdown without alerting attendees to the attack. 115F114 Similarly, police commanders 
decided against sending additional resources to the area of the stadium, opting to keep 
police forces staged and ready for a possible second wave of terrorist attacks. 116F115 While the 
police commanders waited for more attacks at the stadium, they were unprepared for the 
second wave of attacks that happened in the 10th arrondissement district. Twenty minutes 
later, the BRI finally deployed to the 10th arrondissement district, but at that point 15 
people had already been killed and the terrorists had already moved to attack a new area. 117F116  
French police response strategy allows local police officers to self-deploy to active 
emergencies. 118F117 As waves of police officers arrived at the 10th arrondissement, they 
parked their vehicles in locations that would block critical routes of ingress and egress, 
which further delayed BRI’s response.119 F118 As BRI struggled to catch up to the second group 
of terrorists in the 10th arrondissement, the third group of terrorists had already killed a 
security guard and stormed the Bataclan concert hall. Approximately 15 minutes later, a 
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lone police officer armed only with a handgun arrived at the concert hall and shot one of 
the terrorists. 120F119 He was immediately ordered to disengage and wait for BRI, who would 
take another 30 minutes to arrive at the location. 121F120 Two hours later, BRI would finally 
storm the concert hall and kill the two remaining terrorists. 122F121 Table 4 shows the law 
enforcement response challenges as explained in the case study. The data from this table is 
used to identify commonalities between the law enforcement response challenges in the 
Boston and San Bernardino terrorist attacks. 
Table 4. Law Enforcement Response Challenges, Paris Terrorist Attacks 
Law Enforcement Response Paris 
Challenges  Lack of unified command 
 Not prepared for second wave of 
attacks 
 Police vehicles blocked ingress 
and egress routes 
 Delayed response to attack 
 Police officer ordered to 
disengage from terrorists 
 
3. Conclusion 
As the French people tried to make sense of the terrorist attacks, the media and the 
government began to sift through the damage for clues. The resulting investigations pieced 
together vital information about the strategies and methods used by the terrorists while also 
identifying areas to improve police response to future attacks. Investigators discovered that 
several of the terrorist received hands-on training for using rifles and grenades and had 
real-world experience fighting in Syria. 123F122 French authorities were able to determine the 
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terrorists used an encrypted phone application to communicate between teams, with a 
commander in Belgium who helped coordinate the operation. 124F123 Digital evidence from one 
of the terrorist’s phones showed they downloaded detailed floor plans of the Bataclan 
concert hall. 125F124 French police documents suggest the terrorists used the information from 
the maps to select the best locations to attack people inside the concert hall. 126F125 Once in 
place, the terrorists would take turns shooting and reloading to keep a constant rate of 
gunfire to kill as many people as possible.127F126 The final official government report 
summarizing the police response to the terrorist attack will not be available until 2021.  
D. SAN BERNARDINO TERRORIST ATTACK 
San Bernardino County, California, is the largest county in the United States. 
Despite its large size, the employees at the San Bernardino County Environmental Health 
Services (EHS) Department are a tight-knit team. 128F127 On December 2, 2015, EHS 
employees carried holiday decorations into the Inland Regional Center (IRC) to prepare 
for a holiday party after they completed a day of in-house training. 129F128 By all accounts, the 
training day was routine until at 11:00 a.m., when a terrorist wearing all black entered the 
training room and without warning fired a rifle into the crowd.130F129 A second terrorist 
entered the room closely behind the first and also shot into the crowd, accelerating the 
killing. 131F130 Both terrorists fled the location before police arrived but not before killing 14 
people and injuring 22 others. Law enforcement would soon learn one of the terrorists was 
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an EHS employee and that the attack was a “premeditated act of terror inspired by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL).”132F131  
1. Terrorist Attack 
The suspects in the San Bernardino terrorist attack, Syed Farook and his wife, 
Tashfeen Malik, met in 2013 on an online dating service. Later that year, they discussed 
their “joint commitment to jihad and to martyrdom” and in August 2014, were married in 
California.133F132 By all accounts, Syed Farook, who worked for the San Bernardino EHS, 
was quiet and kept to himself. 134F133 Two days before the terrorist attack, Farook visited a 
firearms range carrying a rifle and handgun. Surveillance video shows Farook shooting at 
human silhouette targets and adjusting the sights on his rifle for better accuracy. 135F134  
On the day of the attack, Farook was with his fellow EHS employees at the IRC for 
mandatory training. At 10:30 a.m., while training was still going on, Farook looked at his 
phone and then walked out of the building. 136 F135 Unbeknownst to those inside, Farook and 
Malik were in the parking lot putting on tactical vests, prepping firearms, and arming 
improvised explosive devices for their attack. At 10:58 a.m., the two terrorists exited their 
vehicle, walked toward the IRC building, and immediately killed two men and a woman 
who were outside the entrance to the building. 137F136 Farook and Malik then entered the room 
full of EHS employees and began firing into the crowd. One of the bullets struck a fire 
sprinkler, causing water to spray down and making it hard to see. The terrorists changed 
their tactics and began walking between the tables, shooting anyone at close range who 
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moved or made a sound . 138F137 After approximately three minutes of killing, the terrorists left 
behind a bag with improvised explosive devices and fled the location before police 
arrived.139F138  
Once the terrorists fled the location, Malik posted a Facebook message pledging 
allegiance to ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 140F139 For the next few hours, the 
terrorists avoided capture by driving around San Bernardino County and then returning to 
their home. However, through the use of eyewitness statements and record searches, fast-
thinking detectives were able to track down the terrorists’ identity and their home 
address. 141F140 Around 3:00 p.m., an undercover detective arrived at the terrorists’ home and 
saw them drive away in their SUV. 142F141 The undercover detective followed the terrorists and 
eventually flagged down a Redlands Police Department sergeant and alerted him to the 
situation, at which time the sergeant radioed for help. 143F142 When the police sergeant 
activated the emergency lights on his police vehicle, the terrorists did not yield but 
continued to drive away. 144 F143 Both Farook and Malik took turns donning their bulletproof 
vests and moments later, Malik took a position in the backseat of the SUV and began 
shooting her rifle.145F144  
The back window of the terrorists’ SUV shattered as Malik shot at the Redlands 
police sergeant. 146F145 Farook drove a short distance then slammed on the brakes, bringing the 
SUV to a quick stop, at which time Malik opened the rear passenger door and then 
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continued shooting out the back window.147F146 Farook jumped out of the driver’s seat and 
hid behind the rear passenger door that Malik already opened while also shooting at the 
responding police officers. 148F147 Malik continued shooting at the police officers as Farook 
moved away from the SUV and to the other side of the street. 149F148 As Farook was moving 
and shooting, the police officers realized Farook was trying to outmaneuver the officers 
and gain a position of advantage for his attack. 150F149 The police officers adjusted their 
locations to regain the advantage and continued to shoot at Farook, hitting him in the 
legs. 151F150 Farook fell down, transitioned to a handgun and kept shooting until a bullet struck 
him in the head and  killed him.152F151 Malik continued her attack from the back of the SUV 
as responding officers surrounded the SUV and were shooting back. Eventually, 13 police 
bullets hit Malik’s body and two hit her in the head, which killed her and ended the 
terrorists’ attack. 153F152 Table 5 shows the method of attack used by the San Bernardino 
terrorists as explained in the case study. The data from this table is used to identify the 
commonalities between methods of attack in the Boston and Paris terrorist attacks. 
Table 5. Method of Attack, San Bernardino Terrorists 
Method of Attack San Bernardino 
Organization  Two-person team 
Training  Trained at firearms range prior to attack 
 Internet research on making pipe bombs 
Equipment  Improvised explosive devices 
 Rifles 
 Handguns 
 Medical kit for traumatic injuries 
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Method of Attack San Bernardino 
Strategy  Selected event with large gathering of 
people 
 Left behind explosives to kill first 
responders 
Tactics  Hit-and-run  
 Ambushed police officers 
 Attempted to outmaneuver /flank police 
officers 
 
2. Law Enforcement Response 
When the San Bernardino terrorists fired their first bullet outside the IRC building, 
San Bernardino Police Lieutenant Mike Madden had just picked up food for lunch when 
heard the radio broadcast of a shooting at IRC. 154F153 At 11:04 a.m., Lt. Madden arrived at the 
location and he was quickly joined by three other police officers.155F154 The San Bernardino 
Police Department had previously trained all police officers in active shooter response 
training, so when Lt. Madden told the other officers to form up in a “diamond formation,” 
everyone knew what to do. 156F155 When the team entered the building, it “looked like a bomb 
had gone off.”157 F156 Bodies with horrific wounds were lying around the conference room, 
people were crying for help, there was blood everywhere, the sprinkler systems were 
activated and the building was filled with gun smoke.158F157 Based on their training, the 
officers knew their first priority was to find the attackers, so they continued moving deeper 
into the building, bypassing all those who were injured. 159F158 
The San Bernardino SWAT team was conducting active shooter training when they 
heard the call of “shots fired” at the IRC. They immediately stopped their training and 
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responded to the IRC, arriving 11 minutes after the first emergency radio broadcast. 160F159 As 
the SWAT team geared up to make entry to the building, the SWAT commander evaluated 
the scene, which he would later describe as chaotic. 161F160 Numerous police officers from 
different law enforcement agencies were “doing something but not necessarily working 
cohesively.”162F161 Some officers had wounded people with them but did not know where to 
take them, others kept running in and out of the IRC as they tried to figure out what to do, 
and some officers were standing outside the building pointing their rifles at the second and 
third story windows in case the terrorists suddenly appeared. 163F162 Once the SWAT team was 
geared up, the commander told the team to be cautious of improvised explosive devices, 
and then they entered the building. 164F163 
As the SBPD SWAT team and other police officers cleared the building, it was 
impossible to keep track of which rooms had already been checked since the different 
agencies did not have a standardized marking system. 165F164 Making things even more 
difficult and slowing down the police response was the fact that many of the interior doors 
were locked and required specialized equipment to force them open. 166F165 While the officers 
continued searching for the terrorists, other teams were gathering the wounded to take them 
for medical attention. The overwhelming and unorganized police response resulted in 
police vehicles being left in locations that blocked entry and exit points for paramedics and 
firefighters. 167 F166 Officers with wounded people tried to coordinate with paramedics over 
their radio system but the large volume of radio traffic and poor radio reception inside the 
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IRC made coordination difficult. 168F167 Despite the difficulties, first responders were able to 
transport the wounded survivors to local hospitals within one hour.169F168 
At 12:38 p.m., a unified tactical command post was finally established and police 
supervisors began to coordinate responding resources and document the progress of search 
teams inside the IRC. 170F169 It took officers two hours to evacuate all of the people inside of 
IRC but the building search was not over.171F170 While the evacuation was taking place, SBPD 
police officers, detectives, and analysists were following up on investigative leads in the 
hopes of identifying the attackers. 172F171 An SBPD analyst finally located the suspects’ house 
and the command post decided to send an unmarked police car to the location. 173F172 Members 
of SBPD’s undercover narcotics team also responded to the suspects’ residence without 
asking for permission or notifying the command post. 174F173 At 3:08 p.m., SBPD undercover 
detectives notified the command post they were driving behind the suspected terrorist with 
a Redlands police sergeant.175F174 Less than 30 seconds later, the terrorists began shooting at 
the police officers. The Redlands police sergeant and an SBPD deputy stopped their cars 
approximately 200 feet away from the terrorists and began to return fire.176F175  
When the shooting between the terrorists and police officers started, those police 
officers who were assigned to locations around the IRC building left their assignments and 
drove toward the officer-involved shooting without asking permission or notifying the 
command post. 177F176 The radio frequency immediately became overwhelmed by the large 
amount of responding officers and the officers nearest the shooting were unable to 
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communicate with each other.178F177 The deputy who was closest to the terrorists’ vehicle 
jumped out his car while shooting and continued to shoot as he moved to the rear of his 
patrol vehicle.179 F178 The deputy was pinned behind his patrol car because Farook was 
constantly changing positions to gain a tactical advantage over the deputy and the other 
officers.180 F179 Complicating the situation was the fact that Malik continued to shoot her rifle 
at the officers from the back of the SUV. 181F180 As the deputy behind the patrol car shot all of 
the ammunition in his rifle, shotgun, and then handgun, the other officers realized Farook 
was moving to a better position by flanking the deputy who was pinned down. 182F181 The 
officers quickly adjusted their positions in response, continued to fire their weapons and 
subsequently killed Farook. 183F182 The officers then directed their attention on the threat posed 
by Malik who was still shooting from inside the SUV. The officers repositioned themselves 
around the SUV and returned fire, hitting Malik 15 times, which killed her.184F183  
 Though both terrorists were dead, the police on scene still had work to get done. 
First, the officers wanted an armored vehicle to move up to the terrorists and ensure they 
were in fact dead. However, more than 175 police officers from different agencies had 
arrived at the location and their vehicles blocked the roadways, which delayed the arrival 
of the armored car.185 F184 As the supervisors at the scene of the shooting attempted to get the 
tactical resources they needed, SBPD and the FBI SWAT officers continued to search the 
IRC building for any other threats or explosive devices. At 5:08 p.m., officers finally 
noticed a suspicious bag on a table in the conference room. The bomb squad responded to 
the location and determined the bag contained three active pipe bombs, which they then 
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rendered safe. 186F185 Further investigations revealed that Farook placed the bombs on the 
conference table when he first left the mandatory training session earlier in the day. 187F186 At 
8:37 p.m., the IRC was officially cleared of all threats and handed over to detectives for 
evidence collection. 188F187 Table 6 shows the law enforcement response challenges as 
explained in the case study. The data from this table is used to identify commonalities 
between the law enforcement response challenges in the Boston and Paris terrorist attacks. 
Table 6. Law Enforcement Response Challenges, San Bernardino Terrorists 
Attack 
Law Enforcement Response San Bernardino 
Challenges  Uncoordinated police 
response 
 Police officers self-deployed 
 Police vehicles blocked 
ingress and egress routes 
 Lack of proper equipment to 
force open doors 
 
3. Conclusion 
An after-action review of the San Bernardino terrorist attack revealed that “while 
the number of officers who initially responded to the IRC was necessary, the manner in 
which they responded lacked coordination, adding to an already chaotic scene.”189F188 
Moreover, many responding officers were in unmarked police vehicles, not wearing police 
uniforms, and did not have the correct radio frequencies to communicate with SBPD, which 
made things even more difficult. 190F189 Despite these challenges, police officers were able to 
safely evacuate the IRC and ensure wounded survivors received medical attention. 
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Investigators determined that terrorists Farook and Malik were radicalized by the Islamic 
State and carefully planned out their attack similar to a military operation. 191F190 For example, 
Farook and Malik had a large amount of ammunition, they taped ammunition magazines 
together to more quickly load and unload their firearms, they left behind improvised 
explosive devices to ambush officers responding to IRC, and they also had a backpack with 
military grade medical supplies to address traumatic injuries like gunshot wounds. 192F191 In 
total, the two terrorists killed 14 civilians, injured 22, and wounded two police officers 
before being shot dead by law enforcement.193F192 
E. CASE STUDY COMMONALITIES  
Table 7 lists the terrorists’ methods of attack, Table 8 lists the duration of the attack 
and the number of people injured or killed, and Table 9 lists the challenges to law 
enforcement response. The charts can be used to identify commonalities among all three 
attacks.  
Table 7. Method of Attack among the Three Case Studies 
Method of Attack Boston Paris San Bernardino 
Organization  Two-person 
team 





Training  Internet 










 Trained at 
firearms range 
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Table 8. Results of Attack among the Three Case Studies 
Results of Attack Boston Paris San Bernardino 
Duration of Incident 3 days 3 hours 9 hours 37 minutes 
People Injured 260 500 22 
People Killed 5 130 14 
 




Boston Paris San Bernardino 
Challenges  Uncoordinated 
police response 
 Police officers 
self-deployed 
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pursue fleeing 
terrorist 
 Lack of 
weapons 
discipline 
 Not prepared 
for second wave 
of attacks 





















This chapter examined the terrorist attacks in Boston, Massachusetts; Paris, France; 
and San Bernardino, California. It also discussed the law enforcement response to each 
attack. Terrorists’ methods and duration of attack are compared, the number of people 
injured or killed are listed, and the challenges confronting law enforcement response are 
identified to chart commonalities and differences among all three attacks. A consistent 
challenge with all three law enforcement responses was an uncoordinated police response, 
police self-deployment, and police vehicles blocking ingress and egress routes to the 
location of attacks. The next chapter analyzes military doctrine related to warfare maneuver 
strategy, command and control, and the relationship between strategy and tactics.  
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III. MILITARY DOCTRINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins with an examination of the United States Marine Corps’ 
creation of maneuver warfare strategy. The nature and theory of war is described, including 
how they have coalesced into the modern understanding of maneuver warfare. Next, the 
concepts of command and control, strategy, and tactics are examined as well as how they 
are applied in the broader framework of maneuver warfare strategy. The information 
gleaned from these concepts is used to examine the efficacy of military doctrine and 
maneuver warfare strategy to improve law enforcement command and control efforts for 
mutual aid during active paramilitary terrorist attacks (PTA). 
B. MANEUVER WARFARE STRATEGY 
At the end of the war in Vietnam, a crisis was brewing among the senior ranks of 
Marine Corps generals. Leading up to and during the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps had 
well-established systems in place to train and equip its fighting forces for combat, and yet 
“the bloody sacrifice in that conflict had not staved off defeat.”194F193 The Marine Corps 
generals struggled with two critical questions: “What was the Corps to do and how was the 
Corps to do it?”195F194 At the same time, U.S. Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd was sharing 
the research he had conducted by publishing two seminal essays, “Destruction and 
Creation” and “Patterns of Conflict.” “Destruction and Creation” introduced "a new mental 
framework for analyzing how perception and decision-making contributed to survival on 
an individual level.”196F195 “Patterns of Conflict” applied that same structure to “national 
survival in the face of military conflict.”197F196  
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Colonel Boyd’s research resonated with many of the Corps’ generals. In 1988, 
General Gray, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, created the Marine Corps 
University and announced that research would take place to create a new capstone doctrinal 
manual. 198F197 One year later, General Gray signed his name to Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, 
Warfighting, which signaled the beginning of the Corps’ intellectual renaissance.199F198 
Warfighting was a significant departure from historical Marine Corps manuals in that it did 
not tell Marines how to storm a beach or throw a grenade, but it created the “conceptual 
framework for thinking about war itself.”200F199 Warfighting teaches Marines how to attack 
the opposing forces’ mental and moral cohesion in order to disrupt their adversaries’ ability 
to think and respond effectively. 201F200 Warfighting shifted the Corps’ perceptual lenses from 
the physical aspects of conflict to the intellectual realm. Similarly, the concepts in 
Warfighting have the potential to improve law enforcement’s ability to disrupt the cohesion 
and effectiveness of terrorists who attempt to carry out PTAs in urban environments. As 
Colonel Boyd famously said, “Terrain does not fight wars, people do it, and they use their 
minds.”202F201  
1. Nature of War 
Prussian general and famous military theorist Carl von Clausewitz said: 
“Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.”203 F202 This quote hints at the 
philosophical challenges, complexities, and questions surrounding war. For example, what 
is the nature of war and, more importantly, for this research, how does the philosophy of 
war dovetail with modern-day law enforcement and public safety efforts? Clausewitz 
described war as Zweikampf, meaning “two-struggle,” and believed that war was an 
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interactive social process. 204F203 The Marine Corps built upon this idea by describing war as 
“a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying 
to impose itself on the other.”P205F204 P The main object of war then is to impose one’s will upon 
the enemy while understanding the dynamic ebb and flow between opposing forces. 
In the public safety domain, war is not a new concept in the law enforcement 
profession, but it is a contentious one. For example, in 1965, President Lyndon Johnson 
declared a “War on Crime,” and in 1971, President Richard Nixon declared the nation’s 
“War on Drugs.”206 F205 In modern times, the idea of law enforcement officers fighting a war 
against the public they are sworn to serve has been met with staunch resistance. In the book 
Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of America’s Police Forces, author Radley 
Balko examines how the war on drugs has led to the rapid expansion of police departments 
creating SWAT teams and adopting military equipment to enforce drug laws. P207F206 P Balko’s 
research focuses on the relationships between U.S. law enforcement and the public in 
pursuit of enforcing drug laws. This research is explicitly different from Balko’s in that it 
focuses on law enforcement’s responsibility to shield the public from PTAs and seeks to 
uncover philosophical principles for success in the struggle between opposing wills. 
Also true in law enforcement and public safety domain: the clash between opposing 
wills creates friction, which can make ordinary tasks extraordinarily difficult. Warfighting 
explains that friction can be experienced in many different forms, such as mental, physical, 
external, and even self-induced.208F207 The overarching goal during human conflict is to 
overcome the challenges associated with friction while increasing the effects of friction on 
the opposition. However, using friction to one’s advantage is difficult due to uncertainty, 
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which is ever-present in the struggle between opposing wills. 209F208 Warfighting is explicitly 
clear that because of uncertainty, all actions in human conflict will be “based on 
incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.”210F209 Herein lies a significant 
challenge for law enforcement officers responding to PTAs. Despite law enforcement’s 
best efforts to prepare for PTAs, plans must account for the unknown and be prepared to 
deal with it effectively. The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy offers a possible 
solution. Since uncertainty cannot be eliminated, strategies for dealing with it must be 
flexible and straightforward by “planning for likely contingencies; developing standing 
operating procedures; and fostering initiative among subordinates.”211F210  
The uncertainty of human conflict and the friction it produces creates an 
environment of disorder, and as the old military maxim explains, “No plan survives contact 
with the enemy.”212F211 Because of these challenges, the Marine Corps warfighting 
philosophy draws explicit attention to the ways that science and art are intertwined into the 
dynamics of human conflict. The realm of science in human conflict encompasses the 
“laws of ballistics, mechanics, and like disciplines.”213F212 For law enforcement dealing with 
PTAs, this would include the capabilities of their armaments, communications systems, 
and vehicle delivery platforms. However, Warfighting reminds the reader that in human 
conflict, the realm of art has a more significant role than that of science. 214F213 Art “includes 
the creative, situational application of scientific knowledge through judgment and 
experience, and so the art of war subsumes the science of war.”215F214 Similarly, the equipment 
that law enforcement employs to stop PTAs is less important than the knowledge, 
judgment, and experiences of the officers who are deciding how those assets should be 
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used to stop an attack. In summary, Warfighting explains that the nature of war is a 
“dynamic process of human competition requiring both the knowledge of science and the 
creativity of art but driven ultimately by the power of human will.”216F215 Having established 
the framework for understanding the nature of war, I examine how the Marine Corps uses 
this framework to develop a theory of war.  
2. Theory of War 
The most important concept to understand about the Marine Corps theory of war 
“is that war must serve policy.”217 F216 For law enforcement, this means that the police 
application of force must serve public safety whether the officers are facing criminals or 
terrorists. The actions taken during human conflict can be separated into two categories, 
which are “taking the initiative or reacting in response to the opponent.”218F217 For example, 
establishing checkpoints at border crossings, weapons screenings at large public venues, 
and conducting surveillance operations for terrorist activity are all examples of taking the 
initiative to prevent an attack. Responding to an opponent, such as law enforcement 
reacting to a terrorist attack, is the least preferred form of action since the terrorists have 
already seized the initiative. The fluidity of human conflict is a result of “the interplay 
between initiative and response with the object being to seize and maintain the 
initiative.”219F218  
The Marine Corps theory of war emphasizes the importance of warfare by 
maneuver where the goal is to “circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of 
advantage rather than meet it straight on.”220 F219 The two most critical components of warfare 
by maneuver are speed and focus. 221F220 Speed is the rapidity of action and allows one to 
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“seize the initiative and dictate the terms of action.”222F221 The challenge with speed as a 
weapon is that continually maintaining a high rate of speed is not possible.223F222 This 
challenge can be mitigated by using the concept of focus, which is the convergence of 
superior power “at a particular time and place.”224F223 Therefore, combining speed and focus 
allows the commander to increase the strength and effectiveness of subordinate actions. 225F224 
In the context of law enforcement response to PTAs, police officers would focus 
their efforts on rapidly responding to a decisive location at the decisive moment. 226F225 
However, establishing speed and focus is not enough to gain a superior advantage over an 
opponent in and of itself. According to the Marine Corps theory of war, success “depends 
on the ability to direct our efforts against critical vulnerabilities or centers of gravity.”227F226 
To identify centers of gravity, we must ask ourselves: “Which factors are critical to the 
enemy? Which can the enemy not do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most 
quickly to our will?”228F227 Examples of centers of gravity for terrorists can be their resolve 
to carry out an attack, their capabilities to inflict harm with rifles and explosives, their 
ability to communicate with each other, their methods of travel to carry out attacks and 
avoid capture, or even their ability to cause fear with threats of attack. Simply stated, 
“centers of gravity are any important sources of strength.”229F228 However, not all centers of 
gravity are equal, and some may result in a more significant loss to an opponent, which is 
a critical vulnerability. Critical vulnerabilities are those “that if exploited, will do the most 
significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist.”230F229 Therefore, the theory of war 
                                                 
221 U.S. Marine Corps, 40–41. 
222 U.S. Marine Corps, 41. 
223 U.S. Marine Corps, 41. 
224 U.S. Marine Corps, 42. 
225 U.S. Marine Corps, 41. 
226 U.S. Marine Corps, 49. 
227 U.S. Marine Corps, 46. 
228 U.S. Marine Corps, 46. 
229 U.S. Marine Corps, 47. 
43 
demands that we protect our centers of gravity while at the same time attacking our 
opponent’s most critical vulnerabilities so they are unable to resist. 
3. Maneuver Warfare 
In the context of military operations, maneuver is generally understood to be and 
defined as the “employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination 
with fire … to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.”231F230 Understanding 
the spatial nature of maneuver is an essential factor in achieving an advantage over an 
opponent. However, the Marine Corps model of maneuver warfare moves beyond the 
concept of spatial maneuver to also include psychological, technological, and temporal 
maneuver.232 F231 Therefore, maneuver warfare is best understood as a warfighting philosophy 
that extends beyond the goal of using direct force to disrupting an opponent’s ability to 
fight. The broader concept of maneuver warfare seeks to “shatter the cohesion of the enemy 
system … [where] the ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the 
ability to resist.”233F232 However, maneuver warfare is a double-edged sword in that both sides 
of opposing forces will be confronted with an environment that is “inherently disorderly, 
uncertain, dynamic, and dominated by friction.”234F233 Maneuver warfare accounts for these 
challenges with the use of concepts encapsulated in the philosophy of command. 
Maneuver warfare’s philosophy of command includes three important concepts, 
which are decision-making, mission tactics, and commander’s intent. The philosophy of 
command decision-making recognizes that choices are not made in a vacuum and that we 
must continually account for the opponent’s reactions and counteractions. 235F234 Due to the 
dynamic nature of human conflict, decision-making becomes a time-competitive event 
where “whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, 
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often decisive advantage.”236F235 The primary challenge with decision-making is that every 
situation is unique and has its own, often unknown, associated risks. 237F236 However, the 
philosophy of command dictates that we should not agonize over trying to identify the 
perfect choice. Instead, we should “select a promising course of action with an acceptable 
degree of risk and do it more quickly than our foe.”238F237  
The second critical concept of maneuver warfare philosophy is mission tactics, 
which is the practice of giving a subordinate a mission to accomplish without telling them 
how the mission must be done.239F238 Simply put, mission tactics is telling a subordinate what 
to do but not how to do it. Moreover, mission tactics grant the subordinate freedom to 
decide how the mission is best accomplished based on the circumstances at hand and 
“permits the high tempo of operations that we desire.”240F239 An example of mission tactics 
in the context of law enforcement would be when a commander tells a team of subordinates 
to stop an active shooter at a mall. The commander refrains from telling the subordinates 
how they should approach the mall, the tactics they should use inside the mall, or the safety 
equipment they should deploy. The team of officers are granted the freedom to exercise 
initiative and make decisions as the incident unfolds. It is important to note that mission 
tactics require subordinates to understand “how their actions fit into the larger 
situation.”241F240 Subordinates are able to understand how their actions fit into the overall 
mission through the use of the third concept of maneuver warfare philosophy, which is 
commander’s intent.  Commander’s intent divides any mission into two parts: “the task to 
be accomplished and the reason or intent behind it.”242F241 Of the two parts, the intent is more 
important since it affords the subordinate the ability to make decisions that are in support 
of the overall mission. Furthermore, clearly defining the intent of the overall mission grants 
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subordinates the freedom to change tasks if those tasks are no longer relevant. Granting 
subordinates the freedom to make decisions as events unfold is one of the hallmarks of 
maneuver warfare and demonstrates that maneuver warfare is a “philosophy for generating 
the greatest decisive effect against the enemy at the least possible cost to ourselves—a 
philosophy for fighting smart.”243F242 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The Marine Corps publication Command and Control provides a theory and 
philosophy on how to reach decisions and act on them faster than an opponent. 244F243 It 
accounts for the challenges associated with human conflict as described in Warfighting and 
provides a framework for “fast, flexible, and decisive action in a complex 
environment.”245F244 Furthermore, the Marine Corps command and control doctrine is 
scalable in that it applies to conflicts both large and small as well as to missions outside 
the realm of conflict, such as humanitarian efforts. Most importantly, Command and 
Control allows the commander to “make the most of what they have—people, information, 
material and often, most important of all, time.”246F245 
1. Nature of Command and Control 
Command and control is one of the most important concepts in human conflict 
because without it, “units degenerate into mobs, and the subordination of force to policy is 
replaced by random violence.”247F246 Making things more challenging is that command and 
control is difficult to establish and even harder to maintain. As noted by Carl von 
Clausewitz, “The commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which 
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his best deductive powers cannot always fathom, and with which, because of constant 
changes, he can rarely become familiar.”248 F247  
The traditional view of command and control is one where command and control 
are unidirectional. 249F248 The commander is “in control of their subordinates, and the 
subordinates are under the control of their commanders” (see Figure 1).250 F249 In the Marine 
Corps, command exercises authority and control provides feedback about the effect of the 
action taken. 251F250 For example, the commander exercises their authority by deciding what 
actions should be taken and directs subordinates to carry it out. The subordinates then 
provide feedback on the effects of the actions taken, at which time the commander can 
“adjust and modify command action as needed.”252F251 It is important to note that the Marine 
Corps model of command and control emphasizes feedback, since feedback affords the 
commander the situational awareness to adjust and redirect efforts as they unfold. 253F252 The 
cyclic nature of command and control can be characterized as an open system in that it is 
a process of continuous adaptation that focuses on effectively connecting all available 
resources in a unified approach to defeat an opponent. 254F253  
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Figure 1. Unidirectional and Reciprocal Models of Command and 
Control.255F254 
Command and control consists of three essential elements, which are people, 
information, and the command and control support structure.256 F255 As previously noted in 
Warfighting, human conflict is shaped by human emotions, which is why command and 
control also accounts for the human element in its structure.257F256 Specifically, the 
overarching goal of command and control is to help people perform better by realizing 
humans are “integral components of the command and control system and not merely users 
of it.”258F257 In fact, command and control recognizes that the human capacity for intuition, 
imagination, and creativity during conflict is what makes command and control “ultimately 
an art rather than a science.”259F258  
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Information, the second element of command and control, is defined as “the words, 
letters, numbers, images, and symbols we use to represent things, events, ideas, and 
values.”260F259 Simply stated, information gives shape to the commander’s understanding of 
the situation at hand and provides the structure for making decisions. 261F260 The command and 
control structure uses information for two specific tasks. First, it creates situational 
awareness that is used to make decisions. Second, information is used to “direct and 
coordinate actions in the execution of the decision.”262F261 It is important to note that the 
quality and timeliness of information is more important than the amount of information 
received. For example, inaccurate information can mislead both the commander and 
subordinates and therefore degrade the quality of decisions made and actions taken. The 
key takeaway about information in the command and control structure is that “information 
is valuable only insofar as it contributes to effective decisions and actions.”263F262 
The last element of command and control is the command and control support 
structure, which includes everything a commander has at their disposal to plan, direct, and 
influence the actions of subordinates.264F263 Examples of the command and control support 
structure are “facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel.”265F264 An 
effective command and control support structure allows the commander to generate tempo 
of action by making decisions faster than an opponent. 266F265 Moreover, an effective command 
and control support structure creates opportunities for the commander to “generate swift, 
appropriate, decisive, harmonious, and secure action.”267F266 In a race to make decisions and 
act faster than an opponent, the speed of those decisions and actions taken becomes its own 
weapon to defeat an opponent.  
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2. Theory of Command and Control 
Command and control theory starts with a very simple question, which is: “What 
does it mean to be in control?”268F267 This philosophical question begets more questions such 
as: A pilot is in control of an aircraft, but is the commander really in control of how the 
pilot flies? and Marines are in charge of their weapons but is the commander really in 
control when Marines use their weapons against the enemy? 269F268 Command and control 
theory moves on to suggest that “it is a delusion to believe that we can truly be in control 
of the enemy or the situation.”270F269 Therefore, the goal for the military and law enforcement 
commander is not to pursue precise control, but to create a system that “provides the 
necessary guidance in an uncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without 
stifling the initiative of subordinates.”271F270 
The foundational model used to address the challenges associated with achieving 
command and control is the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop.272F271 During human 
conflict, the commander must first observe the situation, which includes a self-assessment, 
an assessment of the surroundings, and the status of the adversary. 273F272 The next step is to 
orient to the situation by making “estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments” to 
better understand what is occurring. 274F273 The commander must then decide what actions 
should be taken and then put that decision into action. 275F274 Once the OODA loop cycle is 
completed, the entire process starts again, which demonstrates how “command and control 
is a continuous, cyclical process.”276 F275 It is important to note that the OODA loop cycle is 
something that both sides of an opposing force must contend with. In the law enforcement 
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context, both the police commander and their subordinates will move through the OODA 
loop cycle while the terrorists carrying out an attack must also do the same. The aim then 
for law enforcement is to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than the terrorists. 277F276 Most 
importantly, a principle of the OODA loop cycle in command and control theory is that 
“the aim is not merely rapid action, but also meaningful action.”278F277 
A challenge with command and control for both the military and law enforcement 
commander is that the “higher the level of command, the more we depend on information 
from others and the less on our own observations.”279F278 Relying on others for information is 
challenging since everyone interprets and communicates information differently, which 
distorts the information passed along to the commander. 280F279 The second challenge of 
relying on others for information is time. It takes time for information to be passed on to 
the commander, and this delay can result in an inaccurate and outdated sense of the 
situation at hand.281F280 To overcome these challenges, command and control theory proposes 
the commander needs to consider three different perspectives. The first perspective is a 
close view of the situation, also described as “a feel for the action gained best through 
personal observation and experience.”282 F281 This perspective affords the commander an 
awareness of the immediate challenges confronting subordinates.283F282 The second 
perspective is the overall view of the situation, which is described as “topsight.”284F283 A 
commander uses topsight to evaluate the entire situation and how the different aspects are 
connected. The third perspective a commander must consider is one from the opponent’s 
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point of view. With this perspective, the commander’s goal is to “deduce possible enemy 
intentions and anticipate possible enemy moves.”285F284  
As previously noted, any system that is designed to pass along information will be 
challenged by distortion and delay. 286F285 Moreover, due to the dispersed nature of conflict in 
both military and law enforcement operations, it is extremely difficult for the commander 
to be in a position for direct observation. 287F286 To overcome this challenge, command and 
control theory recommends using the directed telescope technique in which a dedicated 
information collector observes events and reports them directly to the commander. 288F287 In 
the law enforcement context, the dedicated information collector can be a subordinate who 
is closest to the conflict and communicates directly back to the commander. Alternatively, 
the dedicated information collector can be a form of technology, like a drone that is flying 
over the event and provides real-time information to the commander. The second technique 
to address the problems associated with information distortion and delay is through the use 
of decentralized decision-making.289F288 Decentralized decision-making allows the 
subordinate who is on-scene and has direct observation of the situation to make decisions 
about what should be done. 290F289 
Command and control theory accepts, and more importantly acknowledges, that 
human conflict is rife with uncertainty. 291 F290 So, just as the Marine Corps warfighting 
philosophy uses mission tactics to effectively deal with uncertainty, command and control 
theory uses a concept called mission command and control. 292F291 Mission command and 
control is a decentralized and flexible decision-making structure that pushes the authority 
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for making decisions to subordinates and affords them freedom of action. 293F292 In contrast, a 
detailed command and control structure relies on precise orders that require exact 
obedience and disincentivizes subordinate initiative. A primary strength of mission 
command and control is that it does not rely on detailed plans and information flow, both 
of which are easily disrupted during human conflict. Mission command and control is best 
described as spontaneous unity of effort where commanders enact concise and simple 
plans, and subordinates make decisions based on “their knowledge of the requirements of 
the overall mission.”294F293 And while “mission command and control demands more of 
leaders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education,” the additional efforts 
help commanders and subordinates to increase the operational tempo and effectively deal 
with uncertainty. 295 F294 Command and Control recommends that leaders provide the 
necessary training and education through the use of a process called planning theory. 
Planning theory is a method designed to develop “practical schemes for taking 
future actions.”296 F295 Planning theory also helps to illuminate future threats and prepare for 
opportunities to mitigate those threats. 297F296 Planning theory divides efforts into three 
different categories: conceptual planning, functional planning, and detailed planning. At 
the highest level of operations, conceptual planning develops tactical, operational, and 
strategic concepts.298F297 Functional planning focuses on the “areas necessary to support the 
overall concept.”299 F298 Some examples include logistical support, deployment of 
subordinates, and the collection of intelligence.300F299 Last, detailed planning primarily deals 
with the technical requirements of an operation, such as calculating the type of equipment 
that will be needed to accomplish the mission. While all three levels of planning require 
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different levels of attention, the overarching goal should be to “leave the subordinate broad 
latitude in the manner of functional or detailed execution.”301F300 
The final theory critical to understanding and implementing mission command and 
control is decision-making theory. Decision-making theory recognizes that “all decisions 
must be made in the face of uncertainty.”302F301 Moreover, decision-making theory does not 
focus on gathering massive amounts of information but emphasizes the importance of 
obtaining the “right elements of information available at the right time and place.”303F302 
Decision-making theory divides decisions into two different processes: analytical decision-
making and intuitive decision-making. Analytical decision-making seeks to identify 
“several different options, comparing all the options according to some set of criteria, and 
identifying the best option.”304F303 Analytical decision-making is most appropriate for pre-
event decision-making efforts regarding “mobilization or contingency planning when time 
is not a factor, and extensive information can be gathered.”305F304 Conversely, intuitive 
decision-making depends on the commander’s “ability to recognize the key elements of a 
particular problem and arrive at the proper decision.”306F305 The intuitive decision-making 
process, which is faster, accounts for the time-sensitive nature of human conflict and 
therefore focuses on identifying the first solution that will solve the problem. 
 In summary, Command and Control is based on “accepting uncertainty as an 
undeniable fact and being able to operate effectively despite it.”307F306 Therefore, mission 
command and control is used to decentralize authority and grants subordinates the freedom 
to take action in support of the overall mission. This, in turn, accelerates operational tempo 
and affords commanders and subordinates opportunities to exploit their opponents in 
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pursuit of victory. 308 F307 Translated in the context of civil authority and law enforcement 
command and control, mission command and control would grant subordinates the 
autonomy to make decisions based on the circumstances in the field that are in alignment 
with the overarching goals as outlined by the commander. At the same time and in response 
to the changing circumstances, the law enforcement commander would make adjustments 
to operational efforts in order to capitalize on opportunities and stop the PTAs. The next 
section focuses on using the theories of command and control to create an effective 
command and control structure.  
3. Creating Effective Command and Control 
As previously mentioned, mission command and control helps the commander deal 
with uncertainty while offering flexibility in response to an opponent in the ever-changing 
environment of human conflict. The theory of mission command and control is applied 
through the use of mission tactics to achieve harmony of effort. 309F308 With mission tactics, 
the commander assigns tasks to subordinates and explains the intent of the mission but 
grants subordinates the freedom to decide how the mission is to be accomplished. 310F309 
However, mission tactics do not give subordinates free rein to do whatever they want, 
which is why commanders should always include some type of restrictive control measures 
to ensure lateral cooperation among other teams/efforts. 311F310 Unity of effort through mission 
tactics is achieved through four different elements: low-level initiative, commander’s 
intent, implicit understanding, and communication. 312F311 
Marine Corps’ warfighting doctrine seeks to create an environment where 
commanders and subordinates can capitalize on fleeting opportunities, which is made 
possible through the use of low-level initiative. 313F312 Low-level initiative gives subordinates 
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the liberty to make their own decisions on how to accomplish a task while also remaining 
mindful of how their actions support the overall effort as described by the commander. 314F313 
The overall efforts are known as the commander’s intent. 315F314 Commander’s intent 
articulates the overall vision for the mission and includes two distinct parts: the task and 
intent.316F315 The task emphasizes the actions to be taken while the intent explains the goals. 
Furthermore, because human conflict is rife with uncertainty, the described intent is more 
important than the given goals. 317F316 Specifically, because it is very likely the situation 
confronting the subordinate will change, thereby making the task obsolete, the described 
intent will allow the subordinate to make choices that are in alignment with the 
commander’s directives. 318F317  
The last two components of mission tactics are implicit understanding and 
communication. Both implicit understanding and communication are aptitudes that can 
only be realized through a “common ethos and repeated practice.”319F318 The Marine Corps 
describes the process for achieving implicit understanding and communication as being 
similar to “members of a jazz band who can improvise freely without losing their 
cohesion.”320F319 Achieving a balance between freedom and cohesion is best accomplished 
through planning, training/education, and doctrine. 321F320  
Planning is a critical component of creating effective command and control and 
should not be thought of as a mechanical or scripted process where tasks need to be 
completed in a strict sequence. 322F321 The Marine Corps philosophy of command and control 
views planning as a learning process where the primary benefit is not “consuming the 
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product but engaging in the process.”323F322 Plans should be seen as a starting point for 
subordinates to freely adapt to situations, and directives should be minimized to only those 
that are required to achieve coordination. 324F323 Furthermore, command and control is best 
created by implementing plans that provide subordinates with options and “facilitate 
effective action in the face of unforeseen events.”325 F324 
Training, education, and doctrine prepare subordinates for their areas of 
responsibility in the command and control structure and should focus on “fostering 
initiative and improving decision making.”326F325 Training scenarios should be created so that 
they introduce participants to uncertainty and disorder and provide them with opportunities 
to develop “pattern recognition skills that are essential to intuitive decision-making.”327F326 
Similarly, education efforts ought to focus on teaching the “appropriate use of techniques 
and procedures … [that optimize] flexibility, speed, and adaptability.”328F327 Most 
importantly, training, education, and doctrine should create a common view on how to best 
understand and deal with the challenges associated with command and control. 329F328 
Marine Corps command and control acknowledges that human conflict is a time-
competitive event that is rife with uncertainty and therefore uses a model of command and 
control that decentralizes decision-making authority. Subordinates are granted the freedom 
to act in support of the commander’s intent, and those actions are communicated back to 
the commander in order to adjust cooperating efforts between other resources. 
Subordinates are given some restrictions, but only those kinds that protect unity of efforts. 
Unity of efforts in command and control is realized through the use of planning, training, 
education, and doctrine. The sum of these concepts helps to create a system of command 
and control that maintains a bias for action and works to generate swift and harmonious 
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efforts to prevail over an opposing force. For civil authorities, this means that the 
philosophy of Marine Corps’ command and control can be used as a template to create new 
ways of organizing and deploying law enforcement resources to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness when responding to and stopping PTAs.  
D. STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy establishes that human conflict is a clash 
of opposing wills in a dynamic environment rife with uncertainty and disorder.330F329 
Warfighting offers strategies to attack an opponent’s “mental and moral cohesion … [to 
interrupt the opponent’s ability to] think and respond effectively.”331F330 Command and 
Control builds upon this warfighting philosophy and offers guidance on how to select and 
enact decisions faster than an opponent. 332F331 Marine Corps’ Strategy and Tactics describes 
how to use available resources to achieve set goals and identifies methods to accomplish 
those objectives. 333F332 
1. Nature of Strategy and Tactics 
The Marine Corps describes strategy as a process of identifying what needs to be 
achieved, determining the optimal means to use resources in pursuit of those goals, and 
then implementing the plan. 334F333 A fundamental nature of strategy is that it is connected to 
policy and politics and, therefore, must operate within those constraints. 335F334 For law 
enforcement, this means any strategies selected to address the threat at PTAs must be 
congruent with the authority and restrictions of department policies, established law, and 
collective will of the communities they serve. Strategies must also account for the 
challenges presented by the physical environment and exploit its strengths while evading 
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its weaknesses.336F335 Concisely stated, strategy is “a specific way of using specified means 
to achieve distinct ends.”337 F336 
While strategy focuses on the goals to be achieved, tactics refer to the concepts and 
methods used to achieve those objectives. 338F337 Tactics are the employment of resources in 
human conflict and are described by the Marine Corps as both an art and a science. 339 F338 The 
“art of tactics” refers to the imaginative and novel implementation of maneuver warfare 
concepts during human conflict, whereas the “science of tactics” refers to the skills 
involved with understanding and applying established techniques and procedures. 340F339 The 
primary objective of tactics in maneuver warfare is to achieve decisive action. 341F340 Decisive 
actions accomplish the assigned mission and “lead to achieving operational and strategic 
goals.”342 F341 And while strategy and tactics can appear to be two separate threads in the 
tapestry of maneuver warfare, they are so tightly entwined that to tug on one is to pull on 
the other. The theories used to select operational and strategic goals are explained in the 
next section. 
2. Strategic and Tactical Theories 
Strategy making is a problem-solving process that requires the strategist to assess 
the challenge they are facing.343F342 The Marine Corps strategic assessment process starts with 
“observing and orienting to the strategic landscape.”344F343 This includes considering the 
physical environment’s geography, terrain, spatial relationships, and lines of 
                                                 
335 U.S. Marine Corps, 22. 
336 U.S. Marine Corps, 37. 
337 U.S. Marine Corps, Tactics, 3. 
338 U.S. Marine Corps, 12. 
339 U.S. Marine Corps, 12. 
340 U.S. Marine Corps, 15. 
341 U.S. Marine Corps, 24. 
342 U.S. Marine Corps, Strategy, 80. 
343 U.S. Marine Corps, 81. 
59 
communication. 345F344 The next step is to assess the nature of the conflict by considering 
questions such as, “What values do both sides attach to the political objectives of war? 
What costs are both sides willing to pay? What material, economic, and human sacrifices 
will the participants endure? For how long? Under what circumstances? Will the societies 
expect regular, measurable progress? Will they patiently endure setbacks and 
frustrations?”346F345 The answers to these questions help to illuminate the desired ends of the 
conflict and the means both sides are willing to use to achieve those ends. 347F346  
After assessing the strategic landscape, the strategist must determine how each side 
of the conflict views its survival and victory. 348F347 Survival is most commonly viewed as the 
“continuance of a way of life or the well-being of the population.”349F348 However, some 
ideological movements are willing to fight until death. 350F349 For these groups, survival lies 
in “leaving behind a heroic legend to influence future generations or in making some other 
kind of lasting statement to humanity or god.”351 F350 Victory is most often understood as 
achieving the desired result for which the group engaged in conflict. 352F351 In reality, victory 
most often means the conflict ends on “terms less unfavorable to oneself than to the 
enemy.”353F352 Clearly identifying survival and victory is a challenging endeavor, which is 
why the strategist must account for numerous perspectives in each conflict. 354F353  
Next, the strategist must identify the political objectives for engaging in a conflict 
that can be unlimited or limited.355F354 Making this determination is an essential component 
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to ensure the political and operational objectives match and support each other.356 F355 
Unlimited political objectives seek to eliminate an adversary through imprisonment or 
deadly force, whereas limited political objectives include anything other than 
imprisonment or deadly force. 357F356 The political objects for law enforcement organizations 
responding to PTAs would be considered unlimited since the primary aims would be to 
apprehend the terrorist for imprisonment or stop their attacks through the use of deadly 
force. Once the political objectives are defined, the strategist moves on to identifying the 
operational objectives for using force that will support the political goals. 
The Marine Corps has identified two specific strategies for using force:  a strategy 
of annihilation and a strategy of erosion. 358F357 A strategy of annihilation “seek[s] to eliminate 
the enemy’s ability to resist, thus leaving him helpless to oppose the imposition of our 
will.”359F358 In contrast, a strategy of erosion looks to “raise the enemy’s costs so high that he 
will find ending the war on our terms more attractive than continuing to fight.”360F359 Both 
strategies can be understood in the context of a law enforcement scenario where police 
officers respond to an active-shooter incident. A strategy of annihilation is when police 
officers shoot and kill the active shooter, thereby eliminating the threat and the attacker’s 
ability to continue fighting. A strategy of erosion would be when police officers surround 
the active shooter inside a building and the suspect surrenders instead of being killed by 
the larger police force that has a position of advantage.  
The strategic development process moves on to consider centers of gravity and 
critical vulnerabilities. A center of gravity is described as a “key source of the enemy’s 
strength, providing either his physical or his psychological capacity to effectively 
resist.”361F360 Focusing on the opponent’s center of gravity forces the strategist to concentrate 
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on “as few key factors as possible.”362F361 Whereas centers of gravity highlight an opponent’s 
strength, critical vulnerabilities seek to identify an opponent’s key weakness. Critical 
vulnerabilities can be identified and evaluated by using a two-step process. 363F362 The 
commander must first determine whether the vulnerability will undermine or destroy a 
center of gravity. 364 F363 If so, the commander must then determine whether the vulnerability 
is something he has the means to capture, destroy, or exploit.21TP”P365F364 21T Once the opponent’s 
centers of gravity are identified, the strategist selects operational objectives that support 
the political objectives. Next, the strategist reviews the identified critical vulnerabilities 
and selects the most effective and efficient means of achieving those operational 
objectives. 366F365 These concepts are then combined to create a strategic concept that guides 
the implementation of operational strategies. 367F366 The strategic concept explains the next 
steps to take and is used as a reference for future plans and decisions. 368F367 
The last, but equally critical component of Marine Corps’ strategy is the theory of 
“just war.” Just war acknowledges that Western societies “demand two things of their 
strategic leaders” in human conflict. 369F368 First, Western societies expect their strategic 
leaders to achieve success that “contributes to the security and societal well-being.”370F369 
Secondly, strategic leaders are expected to be “in the right, a belief that the cause for which 
the people are called to sacrifice is a just one.”371F370 Just war theory identifies seven criteria 
                                                 
361 U.S. Marine Corps, 86. 
362 U.S. Marine Corps, 87. 
363 U.S. Marine Corps, 87. 
364 U.S. Marine Corps, 87. 
365 U.S. Marine Corps, 88. 
366 U.S. Marine Corps, 89. 
367 U.S. Marine Corps, 89. 
368 U.S. Marine Corps, 93. 
369 U.S. Marine Corps, 93. 
370 U.S. Marine Corps, 93. 
62 
that assist the strategist with balancing “what is necessary and what is just.”372 F371 The seven 
just war criteria are as follows:  
 Just Cause. A just cause involves the protection and preservation of 
value. There are three such causes: defense of self or of others against 
attack, retaking of something wrongly taken by force, and punishment of 
concrete wrongs done by an evil power. 
 Right Authority. The person or body authorizing the war must be a 
responsible representative of a sovereign political entity.  
 Right Intention. The intent in waging war must truly be just and not be 
a selfish aim masked as a just cause. 
 Proportionality of Ends. The overall good achieved by the resort to war 
must not be outweighed by the harm it produces. 
 Last Resort. We must show that there is no logical alternative to 
violence. 
 Reasonable Hope of Success. There can be neither moral nor strategic 
justification for resorting to war when there is no hope of success. 
 The Aim of Peace. Ends for which a war is fought must include the 
establishment of stability and peace. 373F372 
While law enforcement officers attempting to stop a PTA are not at war, many of 
the just war criteria can apply to police use of force. American society expects law 
enforcement officers to protect the community with respect for the dignity of life and in a 
manner consistent with the rules of law.374F373 Moreover, just war criteria can be as helpful 
for the law enforcement strategist as it is for the military strategist in that it establishes 
“objective measures from which to judge our motives.”375F374 The strategist needs to be able 
articulate why the strategic concepts and chosen operational objectives are just. 376F375 If 
unable to do so, it is likely the strategic concept and operational objectives are fatally 
flawed.377F376 
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The development of a strategy that supports political objectives requires “discipline 
to study and understand the dynamics of a situation and think through the implications of 
potential actions.”378F377 However, it is important to note that strategy makers will never have 
a complete understanding of the situation at hand. 379F378 Despite this disadvantage, “the 
strategist’s responsibility is to balance opportunity against risk and to balance both against 
uncertainty.”380F379 
3. Applying Strategy and Tactics 
Strategy guides the resources to a specific place and time and creates the framework 
for developing tactics that support the operational and political objectives. 381F380 Identifying 
the optimal tactics to act on in pursuit of operational objectives is not an easy task. The 
tactical arena is a chaotic environment full of complexity and uncertainty around every 
corner.382 F381 Moreover, every conflict is unique and will have its own challenges, which 
means that the best course of action is not immediately apparent or predictable.383F382 Despite 
these challenges, the aim of the commander is to pursue operational objectives and achieve 
success through decisive action. 384F383 In Strategy, the Marine Corps describes the 
components of decisive action in the tactical arena as follows: “identifying enemy critical 
vulnerabilities, shaping the operating area to our advantage, designating a main effort to 
focus our combat power, and acting in a bold and ruthless manner.”385F384 
As already mentioned, critical vulnerabilities are those “that if exploited, will do 
the most significant damage to the enemy’s ability to resist.”386F385 The challenge for the 
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commander is that an exact formula for determining critical vulnerabilities does not exist, 
and critical vulnerabilities are rarely obvious. 387F386 Therefore, “the first requirement of a 
commander is to understand the situation [by developing a mental] picture of what is 
happening, how it got that way, and how it might further develop.”388F387 Next, the commander 
should consider the situation from the perspective of the opponent, which will help to uncover 
additional insight into how the opponent may be defeated.389F388 This mental process is skill best 
described as pattern recognition where “after seeing only a few pieces of the puzzle [the 
commander is able] to fill in the rest of the picture correctly. 390 F389  
Once critical vulnerabilities are identified, the commander must shape the operating 
area to their advantage. 391 F390 In the context of law enforcement responding to a PTA, the 
terrorist’s critical vulnerability will depend on numerous factors such as the location and 
method of the attack, the terrorist’s means of communication, or the resources used to move 
through the environment. For example, evacuating the public from an area where terrorists 
placed explosives will remove the terrorists’ intended targets. Or, roadblocks can disrupt 
the movement of terrorists who are shooting at people from a moving vehicle, thereby 
making the terrorists vulnerable to a direct assault from law enforcement. Whatever the 
critical vulnerability is determined to be, the commander “must be prepared to rapidly take 
advantage of it.”392F391  
The next two elements used for achieving decisive action are identifying the main 
effort and acting boldly. The main effort is the one action “most critical to success at that 
moment” and takes priority over all other actions. 393F392 Therefore, “the main effort becomes 
a harmonizing force for subordinate’s initiative.”394F393 Furthermore, the main effort must be 
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pursued with boldness in order to achieve victory. The law enforcement strategy outlined 
by the Department of Homeland Security for stopping active shooters is an example of 
main effort and boldness. During an active-shooter situation, law enforcement officers are 
to “stop the active shooter as soon as possible … [and] will not stop to help injured 
persons.”395F394 Therefore, during an active-shooter situation, police officers who bypass 
injured citizens to stop the shooter are supporting the main effort and acting with boldness 
in their attempt to stop the threat.  
Marine Corps’ strategy and tactics also provide the commander with several other 
concepts for gaining the advantage in the tactical arena, namely surprise, trapping the 
enemy, developing an ambush mentality, and asymmetry. Achieving surprise can often 
prove to be a decisive factor in gaining an advantage over one’s opponent. 396F395 Surprise can 
be achieved through deception, such as creating the illusion that the commander has more 
forces than the opponent. 397F396 Surprise can also be gained through the use of stealth, where 
a portion of the commander’s forces sneak into a position of advantage against the enemy 
and attack at a critical moment. 398F397 Surprise by stealth also offers forces a better chance of 
trapping the opponent and provides the commander with “a better opportunity to win 
decisively.”399F398 Specifically, trapping an opponent presents them with a new challenge 
where they must think through the dilemma, giving the commander an advantage since the 
opponent is forced to react to our actions. 400F399 
Developing an ambush mentality is an important concept for maneuver warfare, 
strategy, and tactics. 401 F400 The Marine Corps uses several sports analogies to explain the 
ambush mentality, such as the football player who tackles his opponent from the side or 
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the basketball player who blocks a defender so their teammate can score. 402F401 The critical 
point is that “the ambush mentality tries to turn every situation into an ambush.”403F402 The 
commander is advised to look for every opportunity to use surprise and stealth to trap the 
opponent to gain the advantage. 404F403 The ambush mentality complements the concept of 
fighting asymmetrically, which is when we fight “the enemy on our terms rather than on 
his.”405F404 The commander who is fighting asymmetrically does not need superior forces but 
focuses on exploiting the opponent’s vulnerabilities. 406F405 For example, police officers with 
handguns confronting terrorists with handguns are fighting symmetrically. However, 
police officers with rifles, supplemented with SWAT officers in an armored vehicle against 
terrorists armed with handguns is fighting asymmetrically. 
Once the commander gains an advantage over an opponent, that advantage should 
be used to create new opportunities through consolidation, exploitation, or pursuit. 407F406 
Consolidation is when the commander gathers their forces after securing a location with 
the intent to hold against an opponent. 408F407 For example, if terrorists are attacking the 
southern end of a college campus, the commander may have law enforcement officers seize 
and secure buildings in the middle of the campus to protect students from the terrorists and 
hopefully stop the attack. Exploitation is another way for the commander to create new 
opportunities against an opponent. Whereas consolidation can be viewed as a defensive 
tactic, exploitation is offensive in that the commander seeks to disorganize the enemy by 
attacking important activities and functions. 409F408 An example of exploitation would be law 
enforcement officers responding to a terrorist attack and capturing one of the terrorists. The 
commander could have subordinates take the terrorist’s radio communication device and 
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jam the signal so the other terrorists could no longer communicate. Alternatively, the 
commander could use the terrorist’s radio to listen to their communications and then pursue 
the terrorists, which is the third way to gain an advantage. 410F409 Pursuit is an offensive tactic 
where the primary aim is to “catch or cut off a hostile force that has lost cohesion and is 
attempting to escape in order to destroy it.”411F410  
Another essential strategy is the use of reserve forces. A reserve is the portion of 
the commander’s forces that are “withheld from action in order to influence future 
actions.”412F411 A reserve force is important because it affords the commander flexibility to 
address unforeseen challenges and is another means for the commander to retain the 
initiative.413F412 For example, if law enforcement officers are slowed down from closing the 
distance to a team of terrorists, a reserve force can move in from a different direction and 
regain the momentum. A reserve force can also be used for an unforeseen crisis, which is 
why the commander should view the reserve as a tool for clinching the victory. 414 F413 The 
importance of a reserve force was captured by Winston Churchill, who said, “It is in the 
use of withholding of their reserves that the great Commanders have generally 
excelled.”415F414 
E. SUMMARY 
This discussed the Marine Corps framework for understanding war and how this 
framework is used to develop a theory of war. The Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver 
warfare and how decision-making, mission tactics, and commander’s intent are used to 
fight smartly is explained. The nature and theory of command and control is described and 
how the structure is used to create swift and harmonious efforts to defeat an opponent. The 
relationship between strategy and tactics was explained and strategy was shown to be a 
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problem-solving process, which commanders can use to gain an advantage and defeat an 
opposing force. The next chapter examines how maneuver warfare, command and control, 




This chapter examines how the Marine Corps concepts of maneuver warfare, 
command and control, and strategy and tactics might be used to improve law enforcement 
command and control efforts for mutual aid during PTAs. The assessments starts with the 
Boston Marathon Bombing, moves on to the Paris terrorist attacks, and finishes with the 
San Bernardino terrorist attack. With each incident, I describe the law enforcement 
challenges identified in the case studies and derive elements from the Marine Corps 
strategic concepts that could be useful for addressing the law enforcement challenges. The 
information from this chapter is used to offer suggestions for improving law enforcement 
command and control efforts during PTAs, which is addressed in Chapter V.  
B. BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING 
1. Maneuver Warfare Strategy Applied 
Maneuver warfare strategy reminds the reader that human conflict is rife with 
uncertainty and disorder where decisions are made “based on incomplete, inaccurate, or 
even contradictory information.”416F415 Nowhere is this more apparent than the first contact 
Watertown police officers had with terrorists Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. A 
Watertown police officer was driving behind what he thought was a stolen SUV, and as he 
followed the SUV onto a side street, he was immediately confronted with gunfire and 
improvised grenades. 417F416 As a gun battle ensued, officers from Watertown PD and four 
other police agencies responded and parked their police vehicles behind the first officer.418F417 
During the gun battle, terrorist Dzhokhar escaped in a vehicle, and police officers were 
unable to pursue because their own vehicles were parked in a disorganized manner.419F418 This 
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incident highlights three important concepts of maneuver warfare: nonlinearity, warfare by 
maneuver, and speed and focus. 420F419 
First, maneuver warfare describes nonlinearity as situations where “causes and 
effects are disproportionate [and] minor incidents or actions can have decisive effects.”421F420 
An example of this is when the police officers responding to the gun battle left their 
vehicles in the roadway and then ran on foot toward gunfire and explosives. Choosing how 
and where to park a police vehicle may appear minor when fellow officers are being 
attacked with bullets and explosives. However, the manner in which the officers parked led 
to a decisive effect in favor of the terrorist, which is that the police officers could not pursue 
Dzhokhar when he escaped by driving away.  
This leads to the second important concept, which is warfare by maneuver. Warfare 
by maneuver encourages commanders and their subordinates to “circumvent a problem and 
attack it from a position of advantage rather than meet it straight on.”422F421 The officers who 
responded to the shootout between the Tsarnaev brothers and Watertown officers 
confronted the terrorists head-on. Warfare by maneuver suggests that confronting the 
terrorists from the side or rear would have placed officers in a position of advantage over 
the terrorists.  
The third concept of maneuver warfare is speed and focus. Speed is “rapidity of 
action … over distance, or space … [and it] is relative speed that matters rather than 
absolute speed.”423F422 For example, when the terrorists first shot at the Watertown officer, 
responding officers arrived to assist in less than four minutes. 424F423 However, when Dzhokhar 
escaped, the police officers lacked a swift response, which is why maneuver warfare must 
combine speed with focus. The focus is placing resources at a decisive location to be used 
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at a decisive moment. 425F424 Using the concept of speed and focus, responding officers could 
have taken positions that blocked Dzhokhar’s avenues of escape by being in a decisive 
location (blocking escape routes) at a decisive moment (during Dzhokhar’s attempted 
escape). This swift response, focused on limiting the movement of the terrorist, could have 
provided a greater advantage for the police officers on-scene. Table 10 identifies the law 
enforcement challenges and accompanying maneuver warfare strategies that could be used 
to improve performance.  
Table 10. Boston Marathon Bombing Maneuver Warfare Strategy Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Maneuver Warfare Strategy 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and 
egress routes 
 
Nonlinearity: Commanders and subordinates 
should remain aware that “causes and effects 
are disproportionate [and] minor incidents or 
actions can have decisive effects.”426F425  
Uncoordinated police response 
 
Warfare by Maneuver: Avoid an opponent’s 
strength and exploit the opponent’s 
weakness. 427F426 
Police unable to pursue fleeing 
terrorist 
 
Speed and Focus: Speed relative to an 
opponent is more important than absolute 
speed.428F427 A commander should focus 
resources and efforts at a decisive location to 
be used at a “decisive moment. 429F428 
 
2. Command and Control Applied 
A critical component of command and control is planning, which allows the 
commander to develop “practical schemes for taking future actions. 430F429 The value of 
planning under the command and control structure can be seen in law enforcement’s 
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preparation and response to the bombings at the Boston Marathon. Four months before the 
attack, law enforcement commanders, public safety partners such as fire and public health, 
and humanitarian organizations met to initiate planning efforts for the race. 431F430 As a result, 
when the terrorist’s bombs exploded near the finish line, avenues of ingress and egress for 
first responders were already established, and numerous radio broadcasts reminded officers 
to be mindful of where they parked their police cars. 432F431 The planning efforts combined 
with the established command and control structure resulted in the rapid evacuation of 
seriously injured victims within 22 minutes.433F432 Because of the pre-planning efforts and 
assignment of police officers at critical locations, commanders had a keen awareness of 
operational priorities and subordinates acted in support of those objectives. The real test to 
law enforcement’s command and control efforts occurred four days later when law 
enforcement finally located and attempted to capture the outstanding terrorists.  
When a Watertown police officer and sergeant radioed their commander and 
dispatch center to advise they were in a gun battle, the dispatch center requested mutual 
aid from surrounding law enforcement agencies.434F433 Similar to what occurred in the Paris 
and San Bernardino terrorist attacks, the police response to the Watertown shooting was 
uncoordinated. Command and Control emphasizes the importance of mission tactics to 
pursue harmony of efforts. 435F434 Using mission tactics, the commander issues “broad 
guidance rather than detailed directions or directives” and should include restrictive control 
measures but only to the level that protects the unity of efforts. 436F435 For example, during the 
mutual aid response to the Watertown shootout, the commander could have advised 
responding units not to block routes of ingress and egress. This restrictive measure would 
help to protect the unity of efforts as police responded to the shooting, allow officers to 
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redeploy in pursuit of the terrorist, and protect open routes for medical transportation. 
Moreover, the officers at the scene of the shooting could have used the Command and 
Control concept of low-level initiative. Low-level initiative is a critical component of 
mission command and control because it grants subordinates the freedom to make their 
own decisions while remaining mindful of how their actions support mission tactics.437F436 
During the Watertown shootout, an officer demonstrating low-level initiative would have 
assessed the situation and, being mindful of the restrictive control measures, told 
responding officers which roadways to keep open similar, to what occurred during the 
bombing attacks at the Boston Marathon. 438F437  
Approximately 28 minutes after the police shootout with the Tsarnaev brothers, 
Watertown PD identified the Arsenal Mall as the command post staging area.439 F438 
Commanders from several different law enforcement organizations began to develop a plan 
to capture Dzhokhar by cordoning off an area 20 blocks wide. At 5:30 a.m., officers started 
a door-to-door search. 440 F439 As the tactical search was being conducted, “an overwhelming 
number of law enforcement officers arrived in Watertown from across Massachusetts, 
other New England states, and New York.”441F440 Many of those officers self-deployed when 
they heard the Boston Marathon Bombing suspects were possibly in Watertown. 442F441 The 
officers who self-deployed did not request permission from their supervisors or tell their 
agencies they were deploying. 443F442 As the tactical search progressed, “more than 2,500 
officers from 116 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies arrived at the [Arsenal 
Mall] staging area.”444F443 The commanders at the established unified command post did not 
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identify a person or team to account for the self-deployed officers, nor did the commanders 
establish a system to track or “deny access to unnecessary mutual aid support.”445F444 This led 
to confusion about who had overall authority and resulted in a lack of oversight to the point 
that staged officers self-deployed based upon radio transmissions about the possible 
location of the outstanding terrorist, which compromised officer safety. 446F445 Command and 
Control recommends two concepts that could have assisted commanders with addressing 
these challenges: topsight and directed telescope. 447 F446 
Topsight shifts the commander’s focus from the details of the operation to the 
“overhead vantage point … [that] reveals the whole—the big picture; how the parts fit 
together.”448F447 Directed telescope is a technique where the commander identifies a dedicated 
information collector to monitor specific situations and then report back.449 F448 During the 
unified command post operations at the Arsenal Mall, the use of topsight could have 
assisted the commander with perceiving the unfolding situation of self-deployed officers 
at the staging area as it increased to more than 2,500 officers. The commander could have 
then used the directed telescope technique by designating a subordinate to monitor the 
influx of officers and report back. As the commander is updated about the increasing 
number of arriving officers, they could have tasked subordinates to have the unneeded self-
deployed officers return to their jurisdictions or have them remain in place until directed 
to deploy. 
As the influx of self-deployed officers continued to cause disorder at the Arsenal 
Mall staging area, officers tasked with searching for the outstanding terrorist also 
experienced their own unique challenges. While the unified command had designated 
specific areas to be searched and assigned teams a specific grid to search for the outstanding 
terrorist, the search strategy did not go as planned. Specifically, as teams were searching 
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their area of responsibility, there was no way for them to “hold the ground they had already 
searched,” which meant the terrorist could have moved from an unsearched area to a 
location that was already searched. 450F449 Marine Corps doctrine recommends a dynamic form 
of command and control that views “command as the exercise of authority and control as 
feedback about the effects of the action taken.”451F450 In regard to the search operation, the 
unified command exercised authority by designating search areas and identifying teams to 
search each grid. However, the teams did not provide feedback on their inability to secure 
the zones they already searched. 452F451 Therefore, the unified command did not make any 
adjustments to the search strategy because they were unaware of this challenge confronting 
the search teams. Command and Control recognizes that “it is unreasonable to expect 
command and control to provide precise, predictable, and mechanistic order to a complex 
undertaking,”P453F452 P which is why feedback from subordinates is so important.  
Over two hours after the search efforts for the outstanding terrorist was called off, 
a Watertown resident called 911 and told authorities that a person covered in blood was 
hiding in his boat. 454F453 When the information was broadcasted over police radios, officers 
self-deployed, and “within moments, more than 100 officers had gathered in front of and 
behind the home.”455F454 The uncoordinated response and large amount of self-deployed 
officers led to more confusion as it was “unclear who was responsible for the inner and 
outer perimeters.”456 F455 Twelve minutes after the resident first reported the suspicious person 
in his boat, a police officer “without appropriate authority, fired his weapon” at the boat.457F456 
Adding to the chaos, numerous other police officers also began shooting at the boat 
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resulting in “hundreds of rounds being fired,” which only stopped approximately 10 
seconds after an on-scene supervisor ordered a ceasefire. 458 F457  
The police response to the boat where the outstanding terrorist was hiding is an 
example of how situations can gravitate toward disorder and highlights the need for 
restrictive measures to ensure cooperation among first responders. Specifically, using the 
concept of mission command and control, the commander would identify a group of 
officers as a quick reactionary force should an emergency arise. When the 911 call was 
received about the person hiding in the boat, the reactionary force would then respond, and 
the remaining resources would hold their positions until further orders. This approach gives 
the reactionary force the freedom and flexibility to choose how they respond and the 
strategies and tactics they use once on scene. Moreover, the restrictionary measure of 
holding the remaining officers until further notice contributes to a coordinated response 
and reduces uncertainty about who is in control and what actions are to be pursued in 
support of the mission. 
Training and education is a critical component of command and control since it 
helps to foster initiative and improve decision-making.459 F458 Command and Control 
recommends that training scenarios should be used to introduce subordinates to uncertainty 
and disorder while reinforcing the appropriate use of techniques and procedures. 460F459 For 
example, commanders could create a training scenario similar to the incident when officers 
surrounded the boat with the terrorist hiding inside. The training could be designed to 
reinforce the importance of identifying a clear target before shooting a firearm and 
emphasize the importance of only using deadly force in the immediate defense of life. 
Training scenarios could also include circumstances where officers need to choose how 
and where to park their vehicles, which could be used to address the problem of police 
vehicles blocking avenues of ingress and egress. Table 11 identifies the law enforcement 
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challenges and accompanying command and control strategies that could be used to 
improve performance.  
Table 11. Boston Marathon Bombing Command and Control Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Command and Control 
Uncoordinated police response 
 
Mission Tactics: Commanders explain 
the intent of missions and include 
restrictive control measures to ensure 
lateral cooperation among other teams and 
efforts. 461F460 
Topsight: The commander shifts focus 
from the details of the operation to the 
overhead vantage point. 462F461 
Directed Telescope: The commander 
identifies a dedicated information 
collector to monitor specific situations and 
then report back. 463F462 
Command and Control: “The action-
feedback loop makes command and 
control a continuous, cyclic process and 
not a sequence of discrete actions.”464F463 
Training & Education: “Prepare people 
for the roles they play in command and 
control.”465F464 
Police officers self-deployed 
 
 Mission Tactics: Commanders explain 
the intent of missions and include 
restrictive control measures to ensure 
lateral cooperation among other teams and 
efforts. 466F465 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given 
the liberty to make their own decisions 
that are in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent. 467F466 
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Law Enforcement Challenge Command and Control 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and egress 
routes. 
 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given 
the liberty to make their own decisions 
that are in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent. 468F467 
Training: Introduce subordinates to 
uncertainty and disorder while reinforcing 
the “appropriate use of techniques and 
procedures. 469F468 
Lack of weapons discipline Training: Introduce subordinates to 
uncertainty and disorder while reinforcingS 
Sthe “appropriate use of techniques and 
procedures. 470F469 
 
3. Strategy and Tactics Applied 
Strategy is a problem solving process, and the public safety committee for the 
Boston Marathon placed significant effort into planning and training for everything on the 
racecourse, from medical emergencies to terrorist attacks. 471F470 Therefore, when the bombing 
attacks occurred on the day of the race, the strategy put in place by the public safety 
committee created the “framework for developing tactics that support the operational and 
political objectives.”472F471 For example, medical personnel who were assigned to the key 
locations on the route immediately began providing medical care. 473F472 On-scene police 
officers coordinated the response of additional resources and reminded those assets to keep 
avenues of ingress and egress open and clear.474F473 Furthermore, police explosive ordinance 
teams who were stationed at the finish line immediately began searching for other 
explosive devices while also evacuating people from the area. 475F474 The preplanning efforts 
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put in place by the Boston Marathon Public Safety Committee were instrumental in 
achieving decisive action when the bombings occurred. Specifically, the committee shaped 
the environment/racecourse to their advantage; they placed vital resources in critical 
locations and identified the main efforts for different contingencies, including a terrorist 
attack. It is important to note that the public safety response to the Boston bombings 
benefited from the fact that it was a preplanned event where the public safety committee 
had months to plan, prepare, and train. 476F475 In contrast, the police response to the shootout 
in Watertown, Massachusetts, was unplanned and unrehearsed.  
The initial police response to the shootout in Watertown lacked a clear and 
coordinated main effort. Strategy and Tactics establishes that recognizing an opponent’s 
center of gravity, focusing efforts on their critical vulnerability, and shaping the 
environment to one’s advantage are critical concepts for achieving decisive action and 
defeating an opponent. 477F476 For example, the Boston terrorists’ key strength (center of 
gravity) was their freedom of movement, which allowed them to avoid capture from the 
police. Therefore, restricting the movement of the terrorists would exploit their critical 
vulnerability and could have been achieved by shaping the environment during the initial 
police response to the shootout in Watertown. 478F477 Specifically, Tactics points out that 
trapping an opponent can assist the commander in shaping the environment to gain an 
advantage. 479 F478 If a commander had taken control by organizing the police response to the 
Watertown shootout, they could have directed police officers to deploy in positions that 
trapped the terrorists by blocking their avenues of escape. This main effort would have 
become a “harmonizing force for subordinate’s initiative.”480F479 The terrorist would have 
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then been confronted with a change in their circumstances while the police officers 
continued to press their advantage. 481F480  
Tactics and Strategy emphasize the importance of guiding resources to a “particular 
place at a particular time” in order to “balance opportunity against risk and to balance both 
against uncertainty.”482F481 This can be achieved by fighting asymmetrically. Fighting 
asymmetrically is when a commander uses “dissimilar techniques and capabilities to 
maximize our own strengths while exploiting enemy weaknesses.”483 F482 For example, one of 
the first officers to arrive at the location where the outstanding terrorist was hiding inside 
of a boat decided to request a tactical team. 484F483 Using a tactical team to confront threats 
posed by a terrorist is an example of fighting asymmetrically. Specifically, a tactical team 
possesses more equipment, tools, and training than a standard police officer, which gives 
them an advantage over the terrorists and allows the commander to exploit the terrorist’s 
weakness.  
Before tactical teams arrived at the location of the boat, officers started shooting at 
the boat until the on-scene commander yelled for everyone to stop firing.485F484 Strategy 
explicitly states that commander and subordinate actions are connected to policy and “must 
operate within those constraints.”486F485 The police officers who shot at the boat did so based 
on no clear threat, and an after-action report shows that there was “no indication that the 
suspect in the boat had a weapon or fired upon police.”487F486 Strategy also offers just war 
theory to assist the commander and subordinates with criteria to balance decision-making 
when using force. The police shooting at the boat is an example of how quickly situations 
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can gravitate toward disorder and highlights the importance for commanders to rapidly 
enact strategies and tactics to achieve decisive action. 488F487  
The commander at the scene where officers had surrounded the boat finally gained 
control by moving officers out of each other’s line of fire and establishing containment 
around the terrorist’s hiding location. 489F488 Once the scene was less chaotic, the commander 
used highly trained tactical teams, coupled with air support, infrared technology, and 
robots, to safely take the outstanding terrorist into custody. The establishment of a sound 
containment with the blend of skilled personnel and technology is a good example of 
fighting asymmetrically and using a strategy of erosion. Specifically, the commander 
fought asymmetrically by using the advantages of tactical teams and specialized equipment 
to exploit the terrorist’s weaknesses. Next, the commander implemented a strategy of 
erosion by placing the terrorist at such a disadvantage that surrendering to authorities was 
“more attractive than continuing to fight.”490F489 In closing, the police actions during the 
Boston terrorist attacks demonstrate an important concept from Strategy and Tactics: 
success relies on the judgment, experience, and education of subordinates.”491F490 Table 12 
identifies the law enforcement challenges and accompanying strategies and tactics that 
could be used to improve performance.  
Table 12. Boston Marathon Bombing Strategy and Tactics Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Strategy and Tactics 
Uncoordinated police response 
 
Shaping the Environment: Shaping the 
environment helps to “gain the initiative, 
preserve momentum, and control the 
tempo” of the operation 492F491 
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Law Enforcement Challenge Strategy and Tactics 
Trapping: “Trapping allows us to gain 
and maintain the initiative as the enemy is 
forced to react to our actions.”493F492 
Police officers self-deployed 
 
Main Effort: The one action is most 
critical to success, which takes priority 
over all other actions and “becomes a 
harmonizing force for a subordinate’s 
initiative.”494F493 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and egress 
routes. 
 
Shaping the Environment: Shaping the 
environment helps to “gain the initiative, 
preserve momentum, and control the 
tempo” of the operation 495F494 
 
Lack of weapons discipline Strategy: A fundamental nature of 
strategy is that it is connected to policy 
and politics and, therefore, must operate 
within those constraints. 496F495 
 
C. PARIS ATTACKS 
1. Maneuver Warfare Strategy Applied 
When the first bomb exploded outside the Stade de France, law enforcement 
authorities expected a second wave of attacks. Therefore, they decided it was best to not 
evacuate the stadium or flood the area with additional resources. 497 F496 Unknown to 
authorities at the time was that two additional suicide bombers were lying in wait to harm 
more people.498F497 The decision to lock down the stadium instead of evacuating most likely 
saved lives. However, while authorities were prepared to counter a second terrorist attack 
near the stadium, they were not prepared for where the second waves of attacks actually 
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took place in the 10th and 11th arrondissements. 499F498 Warfighting takes the general concept 
of maneuver, which is spatial, and expands it to include other dimensions such as 
psychological, technological, or temporal. 500F499 Therefore, a goal of maneuver warfare “is to 
attack the enemy ‘system’” so they are confronted with “dilemmas in which events happen 
unexpectedly and more quickly” than they can adjust.501F500 For example, when French 
authorities decided to lock down the stadium after the initial terrorist attack, they also 
decided not to inform the stadium attendees or public at large. 502F501 If the authorities had used 
a mass notification system to alert the public about the terrorist attack, those who were in 
the 10th and 11th arrondissements might have been more alert to the pending attacks in 
those districts. However, there is always the chance that a mass notification alert about an 
active terrorist attack could also result in widespread panic where large amounts of people 
flood roadways in an attempt to flee the area. While it is impossible to prove a mass 
notification would have saved lives and removed the element of surprise from the terrorists, 
it is an example of how using technology to attack an opponent’s system could prove 
advantageous.  
The second wave of attacks in the 10th and 11th arrondissements were conducted 
by a team of terrorists who used firearms with hit-and-run tactics. Specifically, the terrorists 
carried out their attacks at intersections with large crowds, which also afforded them 
multiple avenues of escape to carry out more attacks. 503F502 The police response to these 
attacks was unorganized, and similar to what happened in Watertown, French police 
officers left their vehicles parked in a manner that blocked ingress and egress routes, which 
prevented more resources from being deployed in the area. 504F503 This is yet another example 
where the Warfighting concepts of nonlinearity and speed and focus are illuminated. 
                                                 
498 Homeland Security Advisory Council and Paris Public Safety Delegation, 15. 
499 U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, 72. 
500 U.S. Marine Corps, 37,74. 
501 Homeland Security Advisory Council and Paris Public Safety Delegation, The Attack on Paris: 
Lessons Learned, 23. 
502 Homeland Security Advisory Council and Paris Public Safety Delegation, 18. 
503 Homeland Security Advisory Council and Paris Public Safety Delegation, 23. 
84 
Nonlinearity explains that “minor incidents or actions can have decisive effects,” and the 
police vehicles blocking roadways inhibited other police officers from achieving a timely 
response.505F504 Moreover, it took the French anti-terrorist unit, BRI, more than 20 minutes to 
arrive in the area, and by that time, the terrorists had already escaped. 506 F505 Warfighting points 
out that speed relative to an opponent is more important than absolute speed, and in this 
case, the terrorists moved faster than responding police officers and the BRI. 507 F506 
As the BRI searched for the terrorists who were already gone, the third group of 
terrorists arrived at the Bataclan concert hall. As soon as the terrorists exited their vehicle, 
they shot and killed the security guard outside and then stormed the location, shooting at 
the crowd inside for over seven minutes.507 Fifteen minutes after the attack started, a lone 
police officer armed with only a handgun entered the concert hall and shot at one of the 
terrorists, which killed the terrorist when the explosive vest he was wearing detonated.508 
Although the officer was ordered to disengage, his actions are a good example of how 
tempo, surprise, and boldness, which are components of warfare by maneuver, can lead to 
positive outcomes 
Warfare by maneuver states that tempo is itself a weapon and that both the 
commander and subordinates must use the time-competitive rhythm of human conflict to 
gain an advantage over an opponent.509 Increasing tempo to one’s advantage can occur 
with the use of surprise and boldness.510 Law enforcement achieves surprise by intercepting 
an opponent at an unanticipated location or by using methods that are unexpected.511 To 
achieve surprise, the commander or subordinate must act boldly and “pursue major results 
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rather than marginal ones.”512 Warfighting also cautions the reader that “boldness is based 
on strong situational awareness … [and] must be tempered with judgment lest it border on 
recklessness.”513 Table 13 identifies the law enforcement challenges and accompanying 
maneuver warfare strategies that could be used to improve performance.  
Table 13. Paris Attacks Maneuver Warfare Strategy Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Maneuver Warfare Strategy 
Not prepared for second wave of attacks Maneuver Warfare: Generate and exploit 
a psychological, technological, temporal, or 
spatial advantage over an opponent.514 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and 
egress routes 
 
Nonlinearity: Commanders and 
subordinates should remain aware that 
“causes and effects are disproportionate 
[and] minor incidents or actions can have 
decisive effects.”515 
Delayed response to attack Speed and Focus: Speed relative to an 
opponent is more important than absolute 
speed.516 A commander should focus 
resources and effects at a decisive location 
to be used at a decisive moment.517 
Police officer ordered to disengage from 
terrorists 
 
Maneuver Warfare: Tempo is itself a 
weapon and increased tempo can occur with 
the use of surprise and boldness.518 
Surprise is achieved by being bold and 
attacking an enemy in a manner they do not 
expect. To avoid recklessness, boldness 
must be tempered with judgement.519 
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2. Command and Control Applied 
As previously mentioned, French commanders were not prepared for the second 
wave of terrorist attacks that took place in the 10th and 11th arrondissements.520 Command 
and Control recommends that commanders use a technique known as topsight to obtain an 
overall view of the challenges they are facing.521 Using topsight, the commander should 
evaluate the entire situation beyond the immediate crisis to obtain a grasp of the big 
picture.522 Command and Control also recommends the commander views the situation 
“through the eyes of the enemy commander … to deduce possible enemy intentions and 
anticipate possible enemy moves.”523 While it is not possible to prove these techniques 
would have helped the French commanders anticipate the attacks in the 10th and 11th 
arrondissements, these techniques, coupled with the lessons learned in Paris, could be 
useful with assisting future commanders. Moreover, these two perspectives highlight the 
importance of commanders anticipating other methods of attack besides the one with which 
they are currently confronted. 
As the terrorists carried out more attacks throughout Paris, the police response 
“suffered from a lack of an incident command system.”524 Per established protocol, if a 
terrorist attack occurs in France, “BRI and RAID are supposed to jointly mobilize under a 
unified command system.”525 However, both BRI and RAID operated independently from 
each other, which led to more confusion.526 Furthermore, the lack of unity resulted in 
“three separate command posts that were operating independently, exacerbating police 
attempts to get accurate information in real-time.”527 Command and Control emphasizes 
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unity of command, where “any given mission falls within the authority and responsibility 
of a single commander.”528 This interactive system of command and control views 
command as the initiation of action and control as “the feedback about the effects of the 
action taken.”529 Additionally, unity of command assists the commander with generating 
“swift, appropriate, decisive, harmonious, and secure action” to defeat an opponent.530 The 
French protocol for BRI and RAID to jointly mobilize in a unified command during a 
terrorist attack is consistent with the recommendations in Command and Control, but its 
response structure uses a centralized rather than decentralized command and control 
structure.531 According to the doctrine, such a centralized command and control process 
“tends to move slowly: information must be fed up to the top of the chain where sole 
decisionmaking authority resides, and orders must filter to the bottom to be executed.”532 
In contrast, a decentralized command and control structure grants subordinates freedom of 
action and flexibility to make decisions based on the situation at hand.533 
Several French police experts who reviewed the Paris terrorist attacks suggest that 
“the delayed response points to weaknesses in the highly centralized French police 
structure [where] everything has to filter up to the central organization at the 
prefecture.”534  
Command and Control recommends using a system of command and control that 
is “designed for simplicity and speed.535 Simple plan are easier to enact and speed shortens 
“the time needed to make decisions, plan, coordinate and communicate.”536 This can be 
achieved by using a command and control structure that grants commanders the “flexibility 
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to eliminate or bypass selected echelons of command or staff as appropriate in order to 
improve operational tempo.”537 Again, mission tactics and low-level initiative are 
important concepts used to create a nimble and responsive command and control structure. 
Using mission tactics, French commanders would explain their intent for the response to 
the terrorist attacks and identify restrictions that would protect lateral cooperation among 
other teams and efforts.538 The French police officers would be granted the freedom to 
make their own decisions based on the circumstances in the field.539 However, this 
freedom “places a special burden on subordinates, requiring that they always keep the 
larger situation in mind and act in consonance with their senior’s intent.”540  
Command and Control asserts that establishing an understanding of the fine 
balance between mission tactics and low-level initiative can be pursued through 
training.541 First, scenario-based training could be used to prepare commanders and 
subordinates for the positions they hold in the command and control structure and seek to 
cultivate “pattern-recognition skills that are essential to intuitive decisionmaking.”542 
Second, the training scenarios should mirror real-life events by including surprises, last-
minute mission changes, and “purposely include disruption of command and control.”543 
Last, the training scenarios should be debriefed to “teach the appropriate use of techniques 
and procedures” and establish a common perspective for approaching the challenges 
associated with command and control such as uncertainty, disorder, and time.544 Table 14 
identifies the law enforcement challenges and accompanying command and control 
strategies that could be used to improve performance.  
                                                 
537 U.S. Marine Corps, 134. 
538 U.S. Marine Corps, 109, 110. 
539 U.S. Marine Corps, 111. 
540 U.S. Marine Corps, 111. 
541 U.S. Marine Corps, 130. 
542 U.S. Marine Corps, 130. 
543 U.S. Marine Corps, 130. 
544 U.S. Marine Corps, 131. 
89 
Table 14. Paris Attacks Command and Control Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Command and Control 
Not prepared for second wave of attacks 
 
Topsight: The commander shifts focus 
from the details of the operation to the 
overhead vantage point.545 
Enemy Perspective: The commander 
views the situation “through the eyes of 
the enemy commander … [to] deduce 
possible enemy intentions and anticipate 
possible enemy moves.”546 
Lack of unified command 
 
Command and Control: “The action-
feedback loop makes command and 
control a continuous, cyclic process and 
not a sequence of discrete actions.”547 
Unity of Command: Unity of command 
assists the commander with generating 
“swift, appropriate, decisive, harmonious, 
and secure action” to defeat an 
opponent.548 
Delayed response to attack 
 
Mission Tactics: Commanders explain 
the intent of missions and include 
restrictive control measures to ensure 
lateral cooperation amongst other teams 
and efforts.549 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given 
the liberty to make their own decisions 
that are in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent.550 
Speed: Utilize a command and control 
structure that affords flexibility and 
improves operational tempo.551 
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Law Enforcement Challenge Command and Control 
Bias for Action: Command and control 
must be biased toward decision and action 
at all levels.552 
Training & Education: “Prepare people 
for the roles they play in command and 
control.”553  
Police vehicles blocked ingress and egress 
routes 
 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given 
the liberty to make their own decisions 
that are in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent.554 
Training: Introduce subordinates to 
uncertainty and disorder while reinforcing 
the “appropriate use of techniques and 
procedures.555 
Police officer ordered to disengage from 
terrorists 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given 
the liberty to make their own decisions 
that are in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent.556 
Training: Introduce subordinates to 
uncertainty and disorder while reinforcing 
the “appropriate use of techniques and 
procedures.557 
 
3. Strategy and Tactics Applied 
The French policing structure is highly centralized and relies on specialized units 
rather than police officers in the field to deal with dynamic situations such as the Paris terrorist 
attacks.558 The challenge with this type of response strategy is that it takes time for 
information to travel up to the commander and then from the commander out to the specialized 
units for a response. For example, the killings in the 10th and 11th arrondissements had ended 
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20 minutes before police commanders finally deployed BRI to deal with the situation.559 The 
slow sharing of information reduces the commander’s ability to understand the situation and 
achieve decisive action, both of which are core tenets of Strategy and Tactics.560 To 
understand the situation, the commander should “develop in his mind a clear picture of what 
is happening, how it got that way, and how it might further develop.”561 Next, the commander 
should view the situation from the perspective of the opponent, identify what the opponent’s 
strengths are and how to best overcome those strengths.562 Once the commander has an 
understanding of the situation, they should pursue the identified operational objectives 
through decisive action.563  
As BRI deployed to the 10th and 11th arrondissements, they were further delayed 
by the unorganized manner in which police vehicles were blocking roadways. Tactics 
emphasizes that commanders and subordinates should seek to shape the environment to 
“gain the initiative, preserve momentum, and control the tempo” of the operation.564 
Shaping the environment includes actions such as placing subordinates in positions of 
advantage with the goal of surprising or trapping the opponent.565 The abandoned police 
vehicles created an environment that negatively impacted BRI’s response and highlights 
the importance of shaping the environment in a manner that improves police effectiveness. 
Using surprise and having an ambush mentality are key concepts that can assist 
commanders and subordinates with gaining strategic and tactical advantages.566 A good 
example of surprise coupled with an ambush mentality occurred within the first 15 minutes 
of the terrorist attack at the Bataclan concert hall: The terrorists had stormed the concert 
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hall and were killing the attendees when a lone police officer decided to enter.567 Using 
the element of surprise, the police officer ambushed one of the terrorists by shooting at 
him, which killed the terrorist when the suicide belt he was wearing exploded.568 As a 
result of the officer’s actions, the other two terrorists stopped killing the concert-goers and 
retreated to the second floor of the building with hostages.569 The officer was subsequently 
ordered to retreat and wait for BRI to respond.570  
When BRI finally arrived, they stealthily entered the Bataclan concert hall to locate 
the terrorists. During their search, one of the hostages yelled to the police that the terrorists 
wanted to negotiate. BRI subsequently negotiated with the terrorists for over an hour, 
which is an example of a strategy of erosion. A strategy of erosion is when a commander 
attempts “to raise the [opponent’s] costs so high that he will find ending the [conflict] more 
attractive than continuing to fight.”571 As the negotiations continued, the terrorists 
appeared to become more agitated and threatened to explode their suicide vests.572 The 
commander subsequently decided to have subordinates storm the location, at which time a 
shootout between BRI and the terrorist occurred.573 Seconds later, the shooting ended with 
both terrorists dead, and none of the hostages killed.574 The commander’s decision to have 
subordinates confront the terrorists is an example of shifting from a strategy of erosion to 
a strategy of annihilation. A commander should use a strategy of annihilation when the 
goal is to destroy the enemy’s ability to resist by attacking their physical means to offer 
opposition.575 A commander can best decide between a strategy of erosion or annihilation 
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by having a good grasp of the situation and determining which effort will best align with 
operational objectives.576 Table 15 identifies the law enforcement challenges and 
accompanying strategies and tactics that could be used to improve performance. 
Table 15. Paris Attacks Strategy and Tactics Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Strategy and Tactics 
Not prepared for second wave of attacks 
 
Situational Understanding: The 
commander must develop an 
understanding of what is happening, how 
the situation might develop, and what 
efforts will be decisive.577 
Delayed response to attack 
 
Decisive Action: Operational objectives 
should be pursued through decisive 
actions.578 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and egress 
routes 
 
Shaping the Environment: Shaping the 
environment helps to “gain the initiative, 
preserve momentum, and control the 
tempo” of the operation579 
Police officer ordered to disengage from 
terrorists 
Surprise: Using surprise increases 
leverage and can often prove decisive.580 
Ambush Mentality: “The ambush 
mentality tries to turn every situation into 
an ambush.”581 
 
D. SAN BERNARDINO ATTACK 
1. Maneuver Warfare Strategy Applied 
Warfighting reminds the reader that the clash between opposing wills creates 
friction that  can be experienced in many different forms, such as mental, physical, external 
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and even self-induced.582 The police officers responding to the terrorist attack at the Inland 
Regional Center (IRC) experienced self-induced friction with their uncoordinated 
response. For example, San Bernardino Police Chief Jarrod Burguan described the police 
response as “total chaos” and San Bernardino Police Department (SBPD) SWAT lieutenant 
said that “the initial problem was you had a ton of units coming from every agency, all 
these different uniforms, and everyone was running into the building.”583 Chief Burguan 
further stated, “Having so many emergency vehicles eventually would create problems. 
Vehicles were parked randomly as officers sprinted to the IRC while fire engines and 
ambulances staged as close as possible. As the incident continued to unfold, this 
disorganization became more and more problematic as entry and exit lanes were 
blocked.”584 Warfighting recommends that commanders and subordinates continually 
think about the larger situation and how their actions may impact overarching goals.585 As 
already noted in the Boston Marathon Bombing and Paris attacks, commanders and 
subordinates should develop simple, flexible plans and standard operating procedures to 
avoid this type of self-induced friction.586 
The self-induced friction experienced at the IRC also occurred later in the day when 
a police detective had finally located the outstanding terrorists. A Redlands police sergeant 
positioned his police car behind the terrorists, and less than 30 seconds later, the terrorists 
started shooting.587 After an intense shootout that lasted five minutes, the police on the 
scene requested an armored vehicle so they could safely approach the terrorists’ car and 
confirm the terrorists were, in fact, dead.588 However, the armored vehicle had a delayed 
response time because more than 175 police officers from different agencies blocked 
access to the area by the unorganized manner in which they responded and parked their 
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cars.589 This is yet another example where Warfighting suggests that commanders and 
subordinates should remain aware of how “minor incidents or actions can have decisive 
effects” (nonlinearity), and how more care should be given when selecting where resources 
are placed (speed and focus).590 Table 16 identifies the law enforcement challenges and 
accompanying maneuver warfare strategies that could be used to improve performance.  
Table 16. San Bernardino Attack Maneuver Warfare Strategy Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Maneuver Warfare Strategy 
Uncoordinated police response 
 
Maneuver Warfare: Commanders and 
subordinates should think above their own 
level and “act in a way that is in 
consonance with the requirements of the 
larger situation.”591 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and egress 
routes 
 
Nonlinearity: Commanders and 
subordinates should remain aware that 
“causes and effects are disproportionate 
[and] minor incidents or actions can have 
decisive effects.”592 
Police officers self-deployed 
 
Speed and Focus: Speed relative to an 
opponent is more important than absolute 
speed.593 A commander should focus 
resources and effects at a decisive location 
to be used at a decisive moment.594 
 
2. Command and Control Applied 
A primary aim of command and control is to create a system that “provides the 
necessary guidance in an uncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without 
stifling the initiative of subordinates.”595 The police response to the IRC demonstrates the 
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challenges that can arise when a command and control structure is not used. For example, 
it took commanders an hour and forty minutes to establish a unified command post.596 
Prior to the command post’s formation, officers were confronted with several challenges 
that were amplified by the lack of a command and control structure. Specifically, some 
teams of police officers did not know where to take wounded victims; others did not have 
a system in place to keep track of which rooms had been checked; and none of the teams 
had access to breaching equipment to overcome locked doors.  
A dynamic model of command and control could have added more stability to 
police operations at the IRC. The commander would have been able to designate an area 
for officers to take injured victims and establish a system for keeping track of rooms that 
had been checked for the outstanding terrorists. Furthermore, the search teams would have 
been able to provide the unified command with feedback about their need for breaching 
equipment, and the unified command could then act to secure the equipment and deliver it 
to the search teams. The action and feedback loop of command and control helps to 
establish a unity of command to generate swift and harmonious action.597 At the same 
time, allowing subordinates to make decisions that are in alignment with their assigned 
mission grants officers the ability to rapidly exploit fleeting opportunities.598  
As investigative activities were taking place to identify and locate the outstanding 
terrorists, a team of SBPD detectives deployed to the possible residence of the outstanding 
terrorists without notifying the unified command.599 The unified command remained blind 
to the team’s actions until the detectives notified the unified command that they had found 
and were driving behind the outstanding terrorists.600 A few moments later, the terrorists 
began shooting at the detectives, and police officers who were assigned to positions around 
the IRC abandoned their positions and responded to the shooting without notifying the 
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unified command.601 More than 175 police officers from numerous agencies arrived at the 
scene of the shooting, and their unorganized response resulted in roadways being blocked, 
which made it difficult for armored vehicles to arrive on-scene.602 Adding even more 
difficulty to an already tense situation was the fact that the responding officers were 
overwhelming the radio frequencies so that those in the shootout with the terrorists were 
unable to communicate and coordinate efforts.603  
Command and Control recommends the concept of mission tactics to achieve 
harmony of effort.604 Using mission tactics, the commander explains the intent of the 
mission while giving subordinates the freedom to decide how the mission is best 
accomplished.605 However, while mission tactics grants subordinates the liberty to act, 
mission tactics do not give subordinates the authority to act alone and without concern for 
the greater effort.606 Specifically, mission tactics “relies on lateral coordination between 
units as well as communications up and down the chain.”607 For example, the SBPD 
detectives who deployed to the terrorists’ home should have notified the unified command. 
The commander could then have used that information to update their own situational 
awareness, revise resource management if appropriate, and influence future decisions.608 
Similarly, the officers who abandoned their assignments when the shootout with the 
terrorists occurred placed the commander at a disadvantage when they failed to share that 
information. This, in turn, left the commander unaware of the missing officers at the IRC 
and oblivious to the fact that more officers were deploying to the scene of the shooting. 
Command and Control emphasizes the importance of information sharing since 
“information is a control parameter …  [that] creates situational awareness …  [and assists 
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the commander with directing and coordinating] actions in the execution of the 
decision.”609 Table 17 identifies the law enforcement challenges and accompanying 
command and control strategies that could be used to improve performance.  
Table 17. San Bernardino Attack Command and Control Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Command and Control 
Uncoordinated police response 
 
Mission Tactics: commander assigns tasks 
to subordinates who are given the freedom to 
decide how the mission is to be 
accomplished.610 
Command and Control: “The action-
feedback loop makes command and control a 
continuous, cyclic process and not a 
sequence of discrete actions.”611 
Unity of Command: Assist the commander 
with generating “swift, appropriate, decisive, 
harmonious, and secure action” to defeat an 
opponent.612 
Police officers self-deployed 
 
Mission Tactics: Commanders explain the 
intent of missions and include restrictive 
control measures to ensure lateral 
cooperation among other teams and 
efforts.613 
Command and Control: “The action-
feedback loop makes command and control a 
continuous, cyclic process and not a 
sequence of discrete actions.”614 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given the 
liberty to make their own decisions that are 
in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent.615 
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Law Enforcement Challenge Command and Control 
Information Sharing: Information sharing 
provides situational awareness, and helps to 
direct and coordinate actions.616 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and 
egress routes 
 
Mission Tactics: Commanders explain the 
intent of missions and include restrictive 
control measures to ensure lateral 
cooperation among other teams and 
efforts.617 
Low-level Initiative: Subordinates given the 
liberty to make their own decisions that are 
in alignment with mission tactics/
commander’s intent.618 
 
3. Strategy and Tactics Applied 
The SBPD SWAT team was conducting active shooter training when SBPD 
dispatch advised of a real-life active shooter incident at the IRC.619 The SWAT 
commander arrived at the IRC within 11 minutes and saw “cops, sheriff’s deputies, and 
what seemed like dozens of probation officers all doing something but not necessarily 
working cohesively.”620 Identifying the main effort is a concept central to maneuver 
warfare that commanders can implement to harmonize subordinate actions.621 For 
example, during the police response to the IRC, the commander could have identified the 
main effort to be the apprehension of the terrorist attackers. The responding police officers 
would then ask themselves, “How can I best support the main effort?,” and then act 
accordingly.622  
As the SBPD SWAT team and other officers searched the IRC for the outstanding 
terrorists, they were met with confusion, as they did not have a standardized system for 
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keeping track of which rooms had been searched.623 The situation outside the IRC was just 
as chaotic due to the fact that responding officers parked their vehicles in an unorganized 
manner, which blocked ingress and egress for medical personnel.624 Shaping the 
environment is a critical strategy that commanders can use to gain the initiative and 
facilitate the maneuver of friendly forces.625 For example, instituting a standardized 
marking system to keep track of rooms that have been searched would have shaped the 
interior environment of IRC so that teams of officers could have operated more 
expeditiously. Similarly, implementing a strategy for directing responding resources on 
avenues of approach while protecting lanes of access for medical personnel is an example 
of shaping the exterior environment in one’s favor. The main effort for responding officers 
would still be to locate and apprehend the terrorists, but the manner in which they approach 
and disembark their vehicles would support secondary efforts. Establishing the main effort 
and shaping the environment are essential concepts that commanders should use to gain 
the initiative and fight smart.626 S  
The main effort can always shift as events unfold and commanders can also assign 
subordinates to efforts that support the main effort indirectly.627 For example, during the 
terrorist attack in San Bernardino, law enforcement’s main effort was taking place at the 
IRC building. Having an analyst search for the identity of the outstanding terrorists and 
sending detectives to the terrorists’ residence is an example of supporting efforts. When 
the terrorists were finally located, the main effort was redesignated to support those officers 
who were being shot at by the terrorists. Those officers who were searching the IRC 
building should not have abandoned their assignments on their own volition but should 
have continued with their assigned tasks until reassigned by the commander.628 The 
commander’s decision to pursue the outstanding terrorists is consistent with 
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recommendations in Tactics. Specifically, pursuing an opponent is a strategy used to 
exploit advantage by catching or cutting off an opposing force.629 Table 18 identifies the 
law enforcement challenges and accompanying strategies and tactics that could be used to 
improve performance. 
Table 18. San Bernardino Attack Strategy and Tactics Applied 
Law Enforcement Challenge Strategy and Tactics 
Uncoordinated police response 
 
Main Effort: The one action is most 
critical to success, which takes priority 
over all other actions and “becomes a 
harmonizing force for a subordinate’s 
initiative.”630 
Shaping the Environment: Shaping the 
environment helps to “gain the initiative, 
preserve momentum, and control the 
tempo” of the operation631 
Police officers self-deployed 
 
Main Effort: The one action is most 
critical to success, which takes priority 
over all other actions and “becomes a 
harmonizing force for a subordinate’s 
initiative.”632 
Police vehicles blocked ingress and egress 
routes 
 
Shaping the Environment: Shaping the 
environment helps to “gain the initiative, 
preserve momentum, and control the 
tempo” of the operation633 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the Marine Corps concepts of maneuver warfare, command 
and control, and strategy and tactics as well as how they can be applied in a local civil 
municipality context to address the law enforcement challenges during the terrorist attacks 
in Boston, Paris, and San Bernardino. Highlighted are the critical aspects of Marine Corps 
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doctrine and explained how these military principles could be used by law enforcement in 
support of public safety efforts during terrorist attacks. The next chapter takes the 
integration of military doctrine, case studies, and lessons learned to offer recommendations 
for improving law enforcement command and control efforts for mutual aid during active 
PTAs.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this research was to determine if military doctrine and warfare 
maneuver strategy can be used to improve law enforcement command and control efforts 
for mutual aid during PTAs. The thesis began with a comparative case study examining 
PTAs in Boston, Paris, and San Bernardino. The law enforcement response challenges 
common in all three attacks were uncoordinated police responses, police self-deployment, 
and police vehicles blocking ingress and egress to the location of attacks. A review of the 
United States Marine Corps Warfighting, Command and Control, Strategy, and Tactics 
doctrines revealed solutions for improving law enforcement command and control efforts 
for mutual aid during active PTAs. The following recommendations are based on the 
aspects of Marine Corps doctrine that demonstrate usefulness for mitigating the challenges 
in each case study. Moreover, these recommendations focus on further actions to be carried 
out by police executives/commanders at municipal, county, and state law enforcement 
organizations.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Police executives should implement a reciprocal model of command and 
control to improve mutual aid efforts during PTAs.  
All three case studies examined in this thesis demonstrate that police response to 
active PTAs gravitate toward disorder. A reciprocal model of command and control can 
assist law enforcement commanders and subordinates with capitalizing on rapidly 
emerging opportunities to exploit terrorist vulnerabilities when responding to PTAs. A 
reciprocal model of command and control, where commanders employ simple plans and 
subordinates take actions based on the requirements of the mission, can help law 
enforcement organizations better mitigate the challenges of uncertainty, which is ever-
present during PTAs. Furthermore, a reciprocal model of command and control would be 
useful for the commander in charge of the primary response to a PTA and also useful for 
the law enforcement commander from jurisdictions that are providing resources to support 
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response efforts. Specifically, the law enforcement commander in charge of efforts to 
defeat a PTA can use a reciprocal model of command and control to issue orders and make 
swift adjustments based on feedback from the police officers on the front lines of response. 
Similarly, commanders who release their law enforcement resources to support mutual aid 
efforts can use a reciprocal model of command and control to monitor the progress of their 
resources providing mutual aid while at the same time monitoring their own jurisdictions 
for secondary attacks.  
(2) Police leadership should establish a strategy for providing mutual aid 
resources during PTAs while maintaining response capabilities within their 
own jurisdictions. 
A continual challenge in all three case studies was the self-deployment of officers. 
Self-deployment occurs outside the structure of command and control since the officers 
who are self-deploying do so without the permission or acknowledgement from their chain 
of command and without notifying the agency they are responding to help. Moreover, in 
all three case studies the self-deployed officers caused more challenges for the law 
enforcement agency responsible for addressing the terrorist attack. For example, the self-
deployed officers who responded to the area of the terrorist attack did so without 
coordinating with the responsible agency. This resulted in self-deployed officers leaving 
their vehicles in locations that blocked critical routes of ingress and egress and officers 
injecting themselves into police operations that added to the chaos of the situation instead 
of increasing law enforcement’s control. Moreover, in some situations, self-deployed 
officers became frustrated with a lack of assignment and would then take action based on 
their own limited understanding of the situation and without the approval or 
acknowledgment of the incident command.  
Law enforcement executives should establish a command and control strategy for 
mutual aid that balances the concepts of pursuit and consolidation. First, law enforcement 
executives should create a process for identifying and dispatching their police officers to 
neighboring jurisdictions that are confronted with a PTA (pursuit). At the same time, the 
law enforcement organization providing mutual aid should retain adequate resources 
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within their own jurisdiction so they have the appropriate resources to respond to a 
secondary PTA in their area of responsibility (consolidation).  
(3) Police executives should implement training that reinforces the importance 
of mission tactics, low-level initiative, and shaping the environment to 
improve law enforcement response to PTAs. 
Law enforcement executives should ensure subordinates receive training that 
emphasizes low-level initiative while reinforcing the importance of restrictive control 
measures. For example, PTA scenario-based training could be designed so that officers 
need to choose the route they drive to the PTA scenario, where/how they park their vehicle, 
and the actions to carry out once on-scene. The training would then be debriefed to 
highlight best practices, improve pattern recognition skills, reinforce optimal response 
strategies, and ensure subordinate decision-making is congruent with restrictive control 
measures. Furthermore, commanders should also be provided with training that exposes 
them to the common challenges associated with the positions they hold in the command 
and control structure. The commanders undergoing training should be exposed to 
uncertainty and surprise injections to mirror real-life incidents. The training should then be 
debriefed to reinforce learning, enhance the commander’s decision-making skills, and 
ensure actions taken are consistent with policy and the law.  
(4) Create, develop, and deliver a formalized training program to improve law 
enforcement command and control efforts during PTAs and other acts of 
terrorism.  
This recommendation is directed toward the Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security at the Naval Postgraduate School. Unlike the military, the law enforcement 
profession does not have a formalized education institution to instruct law enforcement 
commanders in the theoretical framework of maneuver, strategy, and command and control 
efforts to effectively mitigate the challenges associated with PTAs. The Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School is in the ideal position 
to bring together experts and develop such a course. The course should focus on the 
theoretical framework for analyzing law enforcement preparedness, decision-making, and 
response strategies to PTAs. Similar to the approach taken by the Marine Corps after the 
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Vietnam War, the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate 
School is in the best position to lead a new intellectual renaissance for how the law 
enforcement profession thinks about, prepares for and responds to PTAs.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The focus of this research was to determine if Marine Corps warfare maneuver 
strategy and military doctrine can be used to improve law enforcement command and 
control efforts for mutual aid during PTAs. In all three case studies, this research uncovered 
two fatal flaws that prevented law enforcement from achieving effective command and 
control. First, the longer it takes for subordinates and commanders to establish analogous 
situational awareness and initiate a cycle of lateral cooperation (mission tactics), the longer 
the tactical advantage remains with the terrorists carrying out the attack. Second, 
unrequested and unorganized responding law enforcement resources amplified confusion 
and disorder during the terrorist attacks, making it more difficult for commanders to assert 
authority and gain control. The research shows that many tenets of warfare maneuver 
strategy and military doctrine can be used to illuminate new paths for the law enforcement 
profession to think about, plan for, and mitigate many of the challenges associated with 
PTAs. Warfare maneuver showed that human conflict is rife with uncertainty where the 
law enforcement commander and subordinates must make decisions faster and better than 
the terrorists. Command and Control demonstrated that a fast, flexible, and decentralized 
decision-making structure, focusing on harmony of efforts, allows subordinates to 
capitalize on fleeting opportunities and enables the commander to make adjustments based 
on feedback from the field. Strategy and tactics revealed that commander and subordinate 
actions must be congruent with the rule of law and with respect for the dignity of life. 
Furthermore, strategy and tactics highlighted the importance of exploiting terrorists’ 
critical vulnerabilities while shaping the environment to be advantageous for law 
enforcement efforts. The reality is that it is the men and women of law enforcement, not 
the military, who will be responsible for stopping the next PTA on U.S. soil. The principles 
identified in this research can be used to improve law enforcement response to PTAs 
without reshaping law enforcement to mirror the military. To summarize, this is a SMART 
approach, a Strategic Mutual Aid Response to Terrorism. 
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